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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 Cross-country comparisons of various health care costs and prices have long been confounded 
by substantial differences across countries and time in the baskets of health care services and products 
consumed.  Even when focusing on just one health care product component such as pharmaceuticals, 
research by Danzon and various coauthors has documented that bilateral relative pharmaceutical price 
comparisons across countries can be very sensitive to the choice of which country’s quantity weights are 
utilized in the price index calculations.1  While index number formulae have been developed for pooled 
cross-section time series multilateral price indexes (in which one region’s price index depends on its own 
and all other regions’ quantity weights), as Deaton and Heston [2010] have emphasized in the context of 
purchasing power parities, when substantial quantity weight differences exist both cross-sectionally and 
intertemporally, the interpretation of an hypothetical “base-region” becomes inherently ambiguous and 
uninformative.  As a result, multilateral comparisons typically are anchored by specifying one region-
time period as the base against which various bilateral comparisons are made. Owing perhaps to their 
inherent interpretive ambiguity, therefore, there is very little if any empirical literature on cross-country 
health care cost comparisons based on truly multilateral price indexes. 
 A much narrower focus can, however, be informative.  In the context of pharmaceuticals, various 
researchers have examined generic efficiency rates (defined as, for a given chemical molecule, the 
proportion of all brand plus generic prescription units that are dispensed as generic), and how they 
evolve following loss of patent protection or other market exclusivity, along with variations across 
therapeutic classes and regions; the literature reports both within-country 2   and cross-country 
comparisons of generic efficiency rates and their evolution over time.3  Factors identified as affecting 
variations in generic efficiency paths include: price controls that keep branded prices relatively low and 
thereby provide limited economic incentives for generic entry;4 strategic efforts affecting barriers to 
generic entry, such as advertising, proliferation of “branded generics”, line extensions, “evergreening”, 
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patent challenges, and impact of parallel imports;5 product liability provisions;6 domestic industrial 
policy promotion and costs of generic entry (market approval fees, costs of bioequivalence and drug 
stability studies);7 and the role of physicians vs. pharmacies in brand-generic decision-making.8    
 A related literature expanding beyond analyses of generic efficiency rates focuses on relative 
brand/generic prices, brand pricing following loss of market exclusivity, average molecule price across all 
brand and generic units prescribed following initial generic entry, and molecule-specific price indexes;9 
obviously, since prices and quantities are jointly determined, this pricing literature encompasses generic 
efficiency rates.  A challenge facing these brand-generic analyses involves the fact that the distinction 
between brands and generics is not always clear, both conceptually and empirically.  In a number of 
countries, for example, not only are there “parallel imports” – branded products sold at relatively low 
prices in some countries, such as southern Europe, and then exported and resold at higher prices to 
pharmacies in the UK and northern Europe – whose prices are generally in between generic and 
“domestic” brand prices,10 but some manufacturers market “branded generics”.  IMS Health defines 
branded generics as non-originator products that are either: (i) novel dosage forms of off-patent 
products, often in combination with another molecule; (ii) on patent with a trade name, but a molecule 
copy of an originator product; (iii) off-patent with a trade name; or (iv) off-patent without a trade name 
and from a single source or co-licensed.11  While in the US in 2009 the branded share of revenue dollars 
was 76.9%, the branded generic share was 10.6% and the unbranded generic share was 12.5%,12 in some 
European countries the branded generic share is considerably larger than in the US.13  How one classifies 
parallel imports and branded generics in analyses of brand/generic prices is ambiguous, yet empirical 
results are likely to be very sensitive to the allocation choice. 
 The variability across countries in regulatory frameworks, industrial policy, physician/pharmacy 
autonomy and incentives, brand/generic distinctions, and in how medicine is practiced contributes to 
making interpretation of cross-country pharmaceutical cost comparisons equivocal.  Our goal in this 
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research is to provide insights into cross-country comparisons by: (i) focusing on a number of therapeutic 
classes of prescription drugs (11) that between 2004 and 2010 have experienced patent expiration and 
loss of market exclusivity in eight industrialized countries; (ii) converting revenues and unit sales data to 
cost per day of treatment and number patient days treated, summed and averaged over all molecules 
within each therapeutic class regardless of brand/generic status, using the World Health Organizations’ 
Defined Daily Dosage (WHO DDD) metrics; (iii) compare trends across countries and therapeutic classes 
over time in costs per day of treatment with measures based on price indexes, where the latter is based 
on the average price per day of treatment for each molecule computed over all versions of the molecule 
– brands, generics, branded generics and parallel imports – consistent with procedures employed by the 
US Bureau of Labor Statistics;14 and (iv) using econometric methods, model and quantify factors affecting 
variations in price indexes per day of treatment across countries, therapeutic classes and time.  
 The outline for the remainder of this paper is as follows:  In Section II we begin with a description 
of the underlying IMS MIDAS™ monthly data for eight countries and 11 therapeutic classes, January 2004 
through November 2010, and describe the WHO DDD data.  Then in Section III we summarize formulae 
utilized to construct price indexes, and discuss the specification of our various econometric models.  In 
Section IV we first present average cost per day of treatment findings across countries, therapeutic 
classes and time, and then in Section V we report econometric results at various levels of aggregation, 
quantifying the impacts on price indexes of daily treatment of generic entry, various national policy 
changes, pharmacy/physician autonomy, and other factors.  In Section VI we report results on 
expenditures by country and therapeutic class of alternative simulations involving market environment 
and national policy changes. Finally, in Section VII we provide a summary and interpretation of our 
principal findings. 
II. DATA 
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Sales data are taken from the IMS Health MIDAS™ database, monthly January 2004-November 
2010, covering eight countries:  Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, United States (US) 
and the United Kingdom (UK).  For each of these countries, we extract sales data for drugs in 11 
Anatomic Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classes at a mix of the three and four digit ATC, each having 
notable patent expirations over the 2004-2010 time period:  lipid regulators (ATC classes C10A, C10C and 
C11), antiulcerants (A2B, including both H2-antagonists and proton pump inhibitors), antidepressants 
(N6A4, N6A5 and N6A9 – selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, selective norepinephrine uptake 
inhibitors, other), antipsychotics (N5A, both typical and atypical), ace inhibitors (C9A and C9B, solo and 
combination products), calcium channel blockers (C8A and C8B, solo and combination products), 
osteoporosis (M5B3, M5B9, G3J and H4E), antiplatelets (B1C), beta blockers (C7A and C7B, solo and 
combination products), non-narcotic analgesics (N2B), and antinauseants (A4A1, serotonin antagonist 
antiemetic and other).  Table 1 reports the ranking of these 11 classes in terms of class retail sales for 
each of the eight countries in 2005.  The 11 ATC classes represent eight of the top 12 retail classes in 
2005, comprising the following proportion of total retail prescription drug sales:  Canada 46%, France 
34%, Germany 30%, Italy 32%, Netherlands 34%, Spain 35%, US 38% and UK 42%.  We note in passing 
that the antinauseants are relatively unimportant in all eight countries and overall, while the non-
narcotic analgesics are ranked relatively low except in France and the UK, where they are ranked 10th 
and 11th largest, respectively.   [Place Table 1 somewhere near here]  
IMS Health MIDAS™ sales data in local currencies and extended units by form-strength are 
derived from ex-manufacturer invoices; these data therefore reflect revenues received by 
manufacturers, they exclude wholesale and retail margins, and therefore do not reflect actual 
reimbursement by national health authorities or other insurers to the retail sector.  The local currency 
sales were converted to US dollars at constant exchange rates, as of November 2010, for all countries.  
The MIDAS™ database distinguishes originator brands, parallel imports, and generics (including branded 
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generics), and over-the-counter (OTC) vs. prescription-only drugs.  We transform these sales data into 
days of therapy utilizing the World Health Organization (WHO) Defined Daily Dosage (DDD) metric.  The 
WHO Collaborating Center for Drug Statistics and Methodology defines the DDD as follows:   
“The DDD is the assumed average maintenance dose per day for a drug used for its main 
indication in adults….It should be emphasized that the defined daily dose is a unit of 
measurement and does not necessarily reflect the recommended or Prescribed Daily Dose.  
Doses for individual patients and patient groups will often differ from the DDD and will 
necessarily have to be based on individual characteristics (e.g. age and weight) and 
pharmacokinetic considerations….Drug consumption data presented in DDDs only give a rough 
estimate of consumption and not an exact picture of actual use.  The DDD provide a fixed unit of 
measurement independent of price and dosage form (e.g. tablet strength) enabling the 
researcher to assess trends in drug consumption and to perform comparisons between 
population groups….The DDD is nearly always a compromise based on a review of the available 
information including doses used in various countries when the information is available.  The DDD 
is sometimes a dose that is rarely if ever prescribed, because it is an average of two or more 
commonly used dose sizes.”15        
For our purposes, it is useful to note that the WHO DDD assigned to a drug is time invariant, and is 
identical across countries and dosage strengths.  While it would be preferable to utilize the IMS Health 
daily average consumption (DACON) metric derived and updated from actual retail prescription data, as 
in Berndt and Aitken [2011], currently IMS Health DACON data are only available for some countries, and 
not for all those in our sample. 
Extended units of a drug are divided by the WHO DDD, thereby converting utilization into days of 
therapy.  Sales of a drug by country converted to US dollars using constant November 2010 exchange 
rates are then divided by days of therapy to obtain a measure of cost per day of therapy in US dollars.  In 
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our sample of eight countries and 11 therapeutic classes, utilization encompasses over 47 billion DDDs, 
equivalent to 130 million patient-years.  Cost per day of therapy and number of therapy days are 
computed at both monthly and annual time periods. 
 Research by IMS Health has involved a comparison of costs of daily treatment based on US 
DACON data versus that based on WHO DDD data, for seven selected therapeutic classes between 2006 
and 2009.16  A summary of the comparison is presented in Table 2.  [Table 2 placed near here] 
 Several results are striking.  First, there is no clear pattern in dollar levels – in five therapeutic 
classes in all years (antidepressants, antiplatelets, calcium channel blockers, lipid regulators and 
antiosteoporosis), DACON based daily treatment costs are greater than those based on DDD, whereas in 
two therapeutic classes (antipsychotics and beta blockers) the reverse occurs.  Second, there is no 
obvious pattern between relative daily costs and relative levels of daily costs across therapeutic areas – 
DACON based daily costs are less than DDD based costs for both the lowest cost therapeutic class (beta 
blockers) and for the highest cost therapeutic class (antipsychotics).  Third, the proportional differences 
are not constant.  Moreover, there is a clear pattern in differential growth rates.  In therapeutic classes 
where the DACON based daily treatment costs are greater than those based on  DDD, the proportional 
difference grows over time, with 2005 (2009) DACON/WHO DDD ratios being 1.22 (1.30) for 
antidepressants, 1.22 (1.27) for antiplatelets, 1.41 (1.48) for calcium channel blockers, 1.09 (1.27) for 
lipid regulators, and 1.00 (1.41) for antiosteoporosis drugs.  In comparison, in therapeutic classes where 
the DACON based daily treatment is less than those based on DDD, the proportional difference also 
grows over time, with 2005 (2009) ratios being 0.75 (0.68) for antipsychotics, and 0.69 (0.62) for the beta 
blockers.  We conclude that while for data availability reasons we are forced to utilize DDD data, 
research on differences in DDD vs. DACON based daily cost levels and growth rates merits additional 
analysis.  Given that the DDD values are time and country/region invariant, we will focus more on and 
give greater credence to results based on growth rates than on levels.  
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IMS Health compiles regulatory, national health policy, patient copayment, and national/regional 
reimbursement change events as part of its monitoring in support of the IMS MIDAS™ database product.  
For each of these events, we assign a +1 if we expect the policy to increase cost per day of therapy, a -1 if 
we expect it to decrease the cost per day of therapy, and a zero if we expect it to have no impact on cost 
per day of therapy; we also note the date of the policy event, and designate whether the impact is 
market wide (across all 11 therapeutic classes), or specific to a given therapeutic class or drug.  These 
policy events are organized separately by country, and by therapeutic class.  Appendix A provides details.  
Finally, Danzon and Furukawa [2011] have argued persuasively that national health care 
reimbursement systems can be distinguished based on whether brand-generic decision making is driven 
largely by pharmacies or by physicians, with the former occurring when patients are incentivized with 
lower copayments and pharmacies have incentives to purchase the lowest-cost generics available. By 
contrast, when physicians typically prescribe a specific off-patent molecule by brand name or the 
originator brand, generic suppliers are incentivized to compete on brand image rather than on price; 
Danzon and Furukawa characterize such markets as physician driven.  Although there are differences 
among them, Danzon-Furukawa characterize the US, UK , Netherlands and Canadian markets as 
pharmacy driven and Germany as becoming more so over time, whereas the other European markets in 
our eight-country sample (France, Italy and Spain) are physician driven. They find costs are generally 
lower in pharmacy driven markets, other things equal. We adopt the Danzon and Furukawa classification 
scheme, but in addition characterize France as becoming pharmacy driven in 2006 (when pharmacies 
were first given strong financial incentives to substitute generics for brands) and Germany in 2007. 
III. METHODS 
A. Construction of Alternative Price Indexes 
We utilize alternative price index formulae to construct price index measures of the cost of a day 
of treatment in therapeutic class k in a country n and period t.  For country n, month t, we denote intp  as 
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the cost per day of treatment with drug i belonging to class k, and intq  as the corresponding quantity of 
treatment days sold.  The elementary unit in the various price index calculations is the average price of 
the molecule over all its marketed drug formulations – brand, generics, branded generics and parallel 
imports.  Specifically, we compute a quantity and price for each molecule i and country n and period t, 
such that the quantity of molecule i in country n at t is the sum of quantities of drugs d sold for that 
molecule over its various marketed formulations, i.e., 𝑞𝑖𝑛𝑡 = ∑ 𝑞𝑑𝑛𝑡𝑑∈𝑖  where qdnt is the quantity of drug 
formulation d and the corresponding price is   𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑡 = ∑ 𝑞𝑑𝑛𝑡𝑑∈𝑖 𝑝𝑑𝑛𝑡𝑞𝑖𝑛𝑡 . 
Intertemporal fixed weight price indexes employ fixed weights over all time periods, whereas 
chained price indexes update weights in each time period.  We compute the chained Paasche, Laspeyres 
and Fisher price indices for each therapeutic class k .  The chained Laspeyres price index 𝜋𝑘𝑛𝑡𝑙  uses one 
period lagged quantity weights, and is defined for class k, country n and period t by: 
 𝜋𝑘𝑛𝑡𝑙 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑖∈𝑘 𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑡 
 
where 
 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙 = 𝑞𝑖𝑛𝑡−1∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑛𝑡−1𝑞𝑗𝑛𝑡−1𝑗∈𝑘 . 
 
The corresponding chained Paasche price index 𝜋𝑘𝑛𝑡
𝑝  instead uses current period quantity weights, and is 
defined by: 
 𝜋𝑘𝑛𝑡
𝑝 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑝𝑖∈𝑘 𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑡 
 
where 
 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑝 = 𝑞𝑖𝑛𝑡
∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑛𝑡−1𝑞𝑗𝑛𝑡𝑗∈𝑘
. 
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 For comparison purposes we also construct fixed basis indexes taking the first period of US 
consumption (January 2004) as the fixed reference time/region. The January 2004 US fixed basis 
Laspeyres price index is  calculated as  
𝜋𝑘𝑛𝑡
𝑙1 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑈𝑆1𝑙𝑖∈𝑘 𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑡 , 
while the January 2004 US fixed basis Paasche price index is constructed as  
𝜋𝑘𝑛𝑡
𝑝1 =�𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑝1
𝑖∈𝑘
𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑡 
where 
      𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑝1 = 𝑞𝑖𝑛𝑡
∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑛1𝑞𝑗𝑛𝑡𝑗∈𝑘
. 
Finally, since the choice between the use of lagged or current quantity weights is somewhat 
arbitrary, price index researchers frequently employ as a compromise the Fisher Ideal price index fkntπ   
which is defined as the geometric mean of the Paasche and Laspeyres indices: 
 f p lknt knt kntπ π π= . 
Employing these definitions, we normalize the chained price indices to one by country-
therapeutic class at the January 2004 initial time period.  We note that in our descriptive analyses these 
normalized price indexes are not comparable in levels across countries or across therapeutic classes. 
However, they are useful when assessing the evolution over time of price indexes within each 
therapeutic class and country. We also note that the fixed basis price indexes provide a possible 
comparison across countries, within a therapeutic class. 
B. Specification of Econometric Models 
We specify various econometric models, at the level of the individual therapeutic class, the 
individual molecule, and the individual drug.  For example, for regressions at the therapeutic class level, 
we estimate by ordinary least squares (with standard errors clustered at the country-class level) 
regression equations of the following form, with one observation for therapeutic class k for the 
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therapeutic class level regressions (implicitly constraining coefficients within a therapeutic class and drug 
formulation to be identical across molecules and drugs): log𝜋𝑘𝑛𝑡 = 𝜙𝑛𝑘 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛼𝑋𝑘𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀𝑘𝑛𝑡 , 
where the Xknt  explanatory variables are defined as follows:  
Therapeutic Class Level Explanatory Variables   
Time trend  Linear monthly time trend, January 2004 = 1, February 2004 = 2, etc.17   
ac_price_impact   Index of regulatory events accumulated over time (-1, 0, +1 at each month 
depending on whether policy event is expected to decrease, have no price 
impact, or increase price, respectively) at all-country level   
ac_price_impact_tcl   Index of regulatory events accumulated over time (-1, 0, +1 at each month 
depending on whether policy event is expected to decrease, have no price 
impact, or increase price, respectively) by therapeutic class   
expired_cl   Indicator variable equal to one if at least one patent expired in the 
therapeutic class, else zero   
sh_expired  Share of drugs with expired patent within the therapeutic class 
sh_expired_pharma  sh_expired interacted with indicator variable equal to one when country 
generic substitution is pharmacy driven 
sh_expired_physic  sh_expired interacted with indicator variable equal to one when country 
generic substitution is physician driven 
  
 
The 𝜙𝑛𝑘  are country-class fixed effect components, capturing the effects of base-country 
normalized price indexes being set to unity for each country-class in January 2004. Analogous 
specifications are utilized in the molecule and drug-level regressions.  In the context of chained price 
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indexes, estimates of fixed effects have no ready interpretation. However, when a fixed base period in 
one country is utilized in constructing the normalized price indexes (e.g., US January 2004 = 1.000 for 
osteoporosis) that become the dependent variable in the, say, molecule level regressions, the country 
and class fixed effects parameter estimates are each interpreted as relative to the US January 2004 level 
for osteoporosis drugs. However, estimated coefficients on the time counter and Xknt variables in all the 
normalized price regressions enable us to infer which regulatory events or other variables affected 
prices, as well as the magnitude of such effects.   
For the most disaggregated regressions at the level of drug formulation, several additional 
explanatory variables are included in the specification, defined as follows: 
  
 
Additional Drug Level 
Explanatory  Variables 
 
log_cost  Log price index of cost of daily treatment   
expired  Indicator variable equal to one if drug patent has expired (else zero)   
off_pat_mth  Number of months since drug patent has expired (else zero)   
otc  Indicator variable equal to one if an OTC drug, else zero   
generic  Indicator variable equal to one if a generic, else zero 
  
 
IV. RESULTS:  AVERAGE DAILY COSTS OF THERAPY BY COUNTRY, THERAPEUTIC CLASS AND 
TIME 
Detailed average daily costs of pharmaceutical treatment in US dollars by country, annually by 
therapeutic class for 2004, 2007 and 2010, based on the WHO DDD metrics are presented in two panels 
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of Table 3 – the first panel for Canada, France, Germany and Italy, and the second panel for Netherlands, 
Spain, the UK and the US.  The two panels contain a great deal of data, with patterns of results not 
obvious at first glance.    
As an initial step toward uncovering a set of “big picture facts”, we have undertaken several 
unweighted arithmetic mean calculations involving countries and therapeutic areas.  To gain a sense of 
“country level effects”, for each country we have calculated the unweighted average of daily cost of 
therapy over all therapeutic classes for 2004, 2007 and 2010 (taken from Table 3).  Inspection of the 
entries in Table 3 reveals a clear outlier – the antinauseants, which are likely utilized primarily in the 
inpatient setting, and not via retail, although some retail sales do occur;  recall from Table 1 that over all 
countries, the antinauseants ranked 60th in ex-manufacturer revenues from the retail sector.  Several 
other patterns are evident.  The antinauseants, antipsychotics and antiplatelet classes have the highest 
cost levels in most countries, likely reflecting the fact that they each have several relatively new, patent-
protected products.  In contrast, the ace inhibitors, beta blockers and calcium channel blockers all 
contain very old drugs now subject to generic entry, and thus it is not surprising these classes have the 
lowest daily cost levels.  In between are the classes with a mix of old off-patent and new still patent-
protected products (antiulcerants, antidepressants, lipid regulators, non-narcotic analgesics, and 
antiosteoporosis drugs), with daily cost levels in between, reflecting likely the varying vintage 
composition of the drugs within each therapeutic class.   
With these caveats in mind, we first compute annual average costs of daily therapy separately by 
country but over ten therapeutic classes, excluding antinauseants, as well as over all 11 classes.  Results 
of these summary calculations are presented in Table 4.  [Place Table 4 somewhere near here] 
Several results are noteworthy.  First, comparison of entries in the left panel (ten classes) vs. the 
right panel (all classes) documents the outlier role played by the antinauseants: in 2004, daily cost levels 
of therapy including the antinauseants results in daily costs three to four times larger than when they are 
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excluded, although by 2010 these differences are generally smaller.  Second, in 2004, 2007 and 2010, 
over ten classes, the US and Canada are the highest ranking cost countries, whereas Germany and the UK 
are lowest cost.  However, ranked over all classes including the antinauseants, while the US is highest 
and Canada second in 2004 and 2007, by 2010 US antinauseant prices have dropped sufficiently more 
than in Canada (see Table 3), so that Canada becomes the highest cost country, with the US in second 
place, while Germany remains third highest throughout the 2004-2010 time frame.  Germany’s shift from 
lowest cost country when antinauseants are excluded to third highest when they are included is striking.  
While the UK is second lowest in price throughout the 2004-2010 time period when antinauseants are 
excluded and remains so in 2004 and 2007 even when antinauseants are included, by 2010 over all 
classes Germany rises to fifth place. 
These very simple level calculations yield interesting observations yet obfuscate many 
phenomena, including in particular aggregating over diverse therapeutic classes having very different 
levels and growth rates in daily costs of therapy.  An alternative summary of cost of daily treatment 
trends involves displaying 2004-2010 average annual growth rates (AAGRs) by therapeutic area and by 
country; we do this in Table 5 below.  The “ALL” column is the unweighted average of growth rates in the 
same row over all eight countries, whereas the bottom two rows of Table 5 are the unweighted mean of 
the growth rates in each country over all therapeutic classes (“All Classes”) and excluding the 
antinauseants (“Ten Classes”).  Since the overwhelming majority of AAGRs are negative, we highlight 
positive AAGRs in italics.  [Place Table 5 somewhere near here] 
 As seen in Table 5, while most AAGRs are negative, positive AAGRs are clustered in three 
therapeutic classes – the antipsychotics, non-narcotic analgesics (that in some countries include OTC 
sales), and antiplatelets; over all eight countries, these AAGRs are 0.88%, -1.10% and -2.67%, 
respectively.  The class with the next lowest decline in daily cost is the beta blockers, whose AAGR over 
all countries is -4.56%;  as seen in Table 3, in numerous countries in 2004 this class of drugs already was 
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among the lowest daily treatment costs, and thus the room for further cost declines was somewhat 
limited.    Five of the eleven classes experienced double-digit annual declines in daily costs, averaged 
over all countries:  ace inhibitors (-18.92%), the initially very high cost antinauseants (-14.31%), 
antiulcerants (-12.90%), calcium channel blockers (-12.06%) and lipid regulators (-10.93%), each of which 
experienced major patent expirations and generic entry.  Two other classes having patent expirations 
experienced slightly smaller but still substantial annual declines in daily treatment costs – 
antiosteoporosis drugs at -9.31% and antidepressants at -8.17%.  Finally, while the antinauseant levels of 
daily treatment cost are outliers, as discussed above, they also experienced very substantial daily cost 
declines between 2004 and 2010, and as seen in the bottom right hand corner of Table 5, unweighted 
AAGRs over all classes at -8.55% are only about half a percentage point greater than when antinauseants 
are excluded, -7.97%.  The only country for which exclusion or inclusion of the antinauseants generates a 
substantial difference is the US (-9.27% when included, -5.92% when excluded), so in the analysis that 
follows we focus on results where they are included. 
 At the bottom of Table 5 we report country-specific AAGRs computed as unweighted averages of 
growth rates across therapeutic classes.  Although there are modest differences among them, the eight 
countries can be divided into two groups – one group with very substantial daily treatment cost declines 
(Netherlands with an AAGR of -14.96%, Germany -12.13%, UK -11.56%, and US at -9.27%), and the other 
group with more modest declines (France -3.72%, Canada -3.84%, Spain -5.29%, Italy  -5.65%).  Notably, 
two of the four countries having the smallest declines have been characterized by Danzon-Furukawa 
[2011] as being physician driven markets (Spain and Italy, and France until 2006), the exception being 
Canada, whom they identify as being pharmacy-driven, while France became so in 2006.  At the other 
end, Danzon-Furukawa designate three of the four countries having the largest daily cost declines 
(Netherlands, UK and US) as pharmacy driven, with Germany, the fourth, also becoming more pharmacy-
driven in recent years.     
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   As noted earlier, although these various unweighted mean level and AAGR calculations of daily 
treatment costs are of great interest, they are inadequate in addressing issues of relative utilization, i.e. 
they do not deal well with differential quantity weighting across therapeutic areas, countries and over 
time.  While economic statisticians attempt and to a considerable degree succeed in addressing 
differential weighting issues by use of the various price index formulae discussed above, as we shall now 
see, even with use of state-of-the-art price index formulations, econometric results and their 
interpretation are still somewhat sensitive to index number formulation and aggregation issues. 
V. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS ON INDEXES OF DAILY TREATMENT COSTS 
We now move to a discussion of econometric findings utilizing indexes of cost of daily treatment 
that take into account differential rates of utilization across therapeutic areas, countries and time, based 
on economic index number formulations.  As noted earlier, since there is no clear reason for preferring 
one time period lagged versus current period weights, we employ the Fisher Ideal weights that are a 
geometric mean of the one time period lagged (Laspeyres) and current period (Paasche) weights.  
However, we table econometric results for various Laspeyres and Paasche indexes in Appendix B.  [Place 
Table 6 somewhere near here] 
 Our initial econometric specification involves use of the Fisher chained indexes where the 
observations encompass 83 months (January 2004 thru November 2010), 11 therapeutic areas and eight 
countries (except for Netherlands where data begin in December rather than January 2004, therefore 72 
months), and each country and therapeutic has its own chained index, normalized to 1.000 in January 
2004; in this first regression, fixed effects are specified as the interaction of country and class.  Results 
from two specifications are presented in Table 6.   Estimated standard errors (clustered by country-class) 
are in parentheses; parameter estimates statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are 
designated with a *, **, and ***, respectively.   
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In the first specification, the time trend is significantly negative, while the sh_expired estimate is 
negative but insignificant. However, when the sh_expired variable is disaggregated into the share of 
molecules expired in pharmacy vs. physician driven markets (column 2), the estimated coefficient on the 
sh_expired_pharma variable is negative and statistically significant, whereas the negative estimated 
coefficient on the sh_expired_physic variable is  insignificant, consistent with the notion that pharmacy-
driven pharmaceutical markets are more effective at reducing costs than are physician-driven markets; 
the time counter coefficient estimate is essentially unchanged.  In terms of policy impacts, the estimate 
on the accumulated policy variable is negative and trending toward significance at the country level in 
both columns (recall that the policy counter assigns policy changes expected to reduce costs with a -1, 
and policy changes expected to increase costs with a +1 – hence a positive coefficient estimate is 
consistent with the direction of the hypothesized effect); at the therapeutic class level the estimate is 
positive but insignificant in both specifications.   
 Tables B1 and B2 in Appendix B present findings when instead of the chained Fisher, the 
Laspeyres and Paasche chained price indices are the dependent variable. Estimates on the pharmacy and 
physician driven variables are similar to those with the Fisher index (negative and significant for 
sh_expired_pharma, and larger in absolute value that for sh_expired-physic); estimates on the country 
and therapeutic class accumulated regulatory policy variables are each positive but insignificant for the 
Laspeyres index, while for the Paasche index the country accumulated regulatory negative estimate 
becomes statistically significant at the 10% level.  Estimates on the time trend term are negative and 
significant. 
 The regressions reported in Table 6 have each country’s price index for all therapeutic areas set 
to unity in January 2004.  An alternative basing procedure is to have each country’s price index in all 
therapeutic areas be relative to the US price index for that therapeutic area in January 2004, but still 
retain country*class interacted fixed effects.   Results from these alternative specifications for the 
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Laspeyres, Paasche and Fisher price indexes are presented in Appendix Tables B3, B4 and B5, 
respectively.  The results are qualitatively very similar to those in Appendix Tables B1, B2 and in Table 6 
above.   In particular, estimates on the pharmacy-driven generic share interaction variable are all 
negative and significant, and larger in absolute value than that on the physician-generic share interaction 
variable.  Estimates on the monthly time trend are negative and highly significant.  Estimates on the 
accumulated policy change variables are mostly negative at the country level, varying in statistical 
significance, but positive and insignificant at the therapeutic class level. 
 A somewhat simpler specification involves using the January 2004 US price index as the 
reference base, replacing the 88 country*therapeutic class fixed effects with eight country and 11 
therapeutic class fixed effects, but otherwise retaining the same set of explanatory variables.  In this case 
estimates on the country indicator variables should be interpreted relative to the US.  Estimates with this 
specification and the Fisher price index are presented in Table 7; estimates utilizing the Laspeyres and 
Paasche indexes are given in Appendix Tables B6 and B7, respectively.  [Place Table 7 near here] 
As seen in Table 7, estimates on the time trend coefficient are negative, statistically significant, 
and considerably larger in absolute value than in Table 6.  Estimates on the pharmacy and physician 
driven share generic variables remain negative, and while both are statistically significant, that on the 
pharmacy-generic share variable is slightly larger in absolute value.  In terms of country fixed effects (all 
interpreted relative to the US), the estimated coefficient for Canada is positive but insignificant, while 
that for France is negative and significant at the 10% levele; the increasingly negative estimates for Italy 
are significant at the 5% level, and the ever larger successively negative estimates for Germany, Spain, 
Netherlands and the UK are each significant as well, mostly at the 1% level  In terms of the accumulated 
regulatory policy variables, the estimate of the country level impact is negative in both columns, but 
insignificant in column 2, whereas that at the level of the therapeutic class is positive but insignificant. 
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The unit of observation underlying the coefficient estimates reported in Tables 6 and 7 is a price 
index for a given therapeutic class, country and month.  It is of course possible to avoid index number 
issues entirely, and instead estimate models at the level of the individual molecule for each country and 
month.  This greatly increases the number of observation, from about 7,200 to about 200,000.  When 
estimated at this level of molecule detail, we can add several explanatory variables, including whether 
the patent on that molecule has expired (Generic dummy, and then interacted with pharmacy or 
physician driven market – Expired*pharmacy driven and Expired*physician driven), months since the 
molecule has faced generic entry if that occurred during the January 2004 – November 2010 time frame 
(Off_pat_mth), for those molecules already facing generic entry in January 2004 but whose patent 
expiration date is unknown (Off_month_unknown), and an indicator variable equal to one if the 
molecule is sold in  an over-the-counter  version (OTC dummy).   
In Table 8 we report a variety of estimates based on alternative specifications with various 
explanatory variables included, and several fixed effect specifications.  Three alternative regression 
specifications are estimated each with three alternative fixed effect specifications: With neither 
molecule nor country*class fixed effects (Columns 1-3), only country*class fixed effects (Columns 4-6), 
and only molecule across-country fixed effects (Columns 7-9).  Although the relevant parameter 
estimates are quite robust, here we focus our discussion on estimates in Columns 3, 6 and 9. [Place Table 
8 somewhere near here] 
Monthly time trend estimates are negative for every specification, and significant when 
molecule fixed effects are included (Column 9).  Parameter estimates on the Expired*pharmacy driven 
variable are negative, significant, and roughly 50-100% larger than the negative estimate on the 
Expired*physician driven variable.  The column 6 and 9 estimates on the Off_month_unknown variable 
are negative and significant, quite large in absolute value, while estimates on the months off patent 
counter variable Off_pat_mth are also negative and significant.  The coefficient estimate on the OTC 
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dummy variable is mostly negative, but not statistically significant.  Although the estimate on the generic 
indicator variable is significantly negative in the specification with no molecule or country*class fixed 
effects (Column 3), it is negative but insignificant when either country*class (Column 6) or molecule 
(Column 9) fixed effects are included.  In terms of the accumulated regulatory policy variables, estimates 
at the country level are mixed in sign, but positive and insignificant in the molecule and country*class 
fixed effect specifications (Columns 6 and 9); at the therapeutic class level, the estimates are mostly 
positive, and of varying statistical significance. 
In the specification with no country*class or molecule fixed effects (Column 3), estimates on the 
therapeutic class indicator variables (interpreted relative to antiosteoporosis drugs) are positive and 
largest for antinauseants, followed by positive and significant estimates for antipsychotic and 
antiplatelet drugs, and a positive but insignificant estimate for the non-narcotic analgesic drugs.  
Estimates on the antiulcerants, lipid regulators, antidepressants, calcium channel blockers, beta blockers 
and ace inhibitors are all negative and significant, and successively larger in absolute value.    Finally, in 
the same specification with no country*class or molecule fixed effects, estimates on the country 
indicator variables are interpreted as relative to the US.  As seen in column 3, while the estimate for 
Canada is positive, it is not significant.  However, estimates are negative, significant and successively 
larger in absolute value for the UK, Netherlands, France, Germany, Spain, and Italy, with the latter three 
being very close to each other in magnitude. 
The next set of models estimated are at the level of the specific drug (molecule formulation), 
where molecules can differ by strength, form, generic vs. brand, and OTC vs. Rx-only.    This adds 
between 75,000 and almost 100,000 observations to the data set.  Results are presented in Table 9.  As 
in the previous table, estimates in the first three  columns of Table 9 are based on a model without 
either country*class or molecule fixed effects, those in columns 4-6 have only country*class fixed effects, 
while those in columns 7-9 have only molecule fixed effects.  Again we focus on estimates in columns 3, 
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6 and 9.  Estimates on the monthly time trend variable are positive but insignificant in Columns 3 and 6, 
but in Column 9 the estimate is negative and significant. Estimates on the expired*pharmacy and 
expired*physician driven estimates are always negative with the absolute value of the 
expired*pharmacy being larger than on the expired*physician term, but their statistical significance 
declines going from columns 3 to 6 to 9. The coefficient estimate on the Off_month_unknown indicator 
variable is negative, significant and large in absolute value across all models, while the negative 
estimates on the Off_pat_mth monthly counter variable are similar in magnitude and sign across all 
models, and are also statistically significant.  Estimates of the effect of the specific drug formulation 
being a generic are uniformly negative and statistically significant. These results imply that once a drug 
formulation encounters generic competition, other things equal, its price falls substantially immediately 
and increasingly as time passes.  Although the estimates on the OTC indicator variable are consistently 
negative across all models, they are never significant.  In terms of the accumulated regulatory policy 
variables, across all model specifications, at the country level they are positive, but significant only in 
Column 9, whereas at the level of the therapeutic class, they are positive and significant in almost all 
columns, and generally larger than at the country level.  [Table 9 somewhere near here] 
In the specification with no country*class or molecule fixed effects (Columns 1-3), estimates on 
the therapeutic class indicator variables are interpreted as relative to the antiosteoporosis drugs.  
Results in Table 9 are qualitatively very similar to those in Table 8: Daily costs of therapy are highest 
among the antinauseants, followed by antipsychotics and antiplatelets (the last not statistically 
significant), followed by the non-narcotic analgesics being of mixed sign relative to antiosteoporosis 
drugs, but not statistically significant. However, daily costs of therapy are successively smaller than the 
reference antiosteoporosis drugs in the antiulcerant, lipid regulator and antidepressant classes, and drop 
even more sharply among the calcium channel blockers, beta blockers and especially the ace inhibitors. 
Finally, in terms of country fixed effects (all interpreted relative to the US), parameter estimates for 
Page 22 
 
every country are negative (although that for Canada is not significant), and become successively larger 
in absolute value going from France, to the UK, Netherlands, Italy, Germany and Spain. 
One functional form assumption implicit in the regression results reported in Table 9 is that the 
coefficient on the off patent monthly counter variable is identical across countries.  We now explore two 
alternative models.  First, we delete the Off_pat_mth counter variable, and replace it with eight 
country*Off_pat_mth interaction variables, thereby allowing the effect of time since being off patent to 
vary across each of the eight countries in our sample.  Second, we replace the Off_pat_mth counter 
variable with two interaction variables, constraining the effect of months off patent to be the same 
within the four pharmacy driven markets (US, Canada, UK and Netherlands), and the same within the 
physician driven markets (France until 2006, Germany until 2007, Italy and Spain), but allowing the 
coefficients on the pharmacy_off interaction variable to differ from that on the physician_off variable.  
Although this classification is a rough one, we expect it will capture some of the market-wide effects 
analyzed by Danzon and Furukawa.   Results of this estimation are given in Table 10.  We focus on results 
in Columns 2 and 4.  [Place Table 10 somewhere near here]. 
 
 Table 10 shows that once patent expiration occurs, prices fall almost twice as much in pharmacy 
driven than in physician driven markets; prices also fall further when the molecule formulation is a 
generic (about 5% of molecules in our sample are off-patent but have no generic competition).  
According to column 2, while prices increase significantly as months off patent increase in the US, prices 
decrease but insignificantly as months off patent increase in Italy and Canada, and decrease significantly 
and at successively greater rates in the Netherlands, France and the UK as months off patent increase.   
Note that even for the US, the net effect of being off-patent but having no generic competition is 
negative for the first 82 months after patent expiration (-0.508/0.00616 = 82.5), and is negative for the 
first 144 months if in addition to being off-patent the molecule faces generic competition (-
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0.890/0.00616 = 144.5  Interestingly, as seen in column 4, while the time invariant impact of being off 
patent is negative and twice as large in pharmacy driven than physician driven markets, the rate of price 
decline as months off patent increases is larger in physician driven than in pharmacy driven markets.  
Finally, note that in both these specifications, cumulative regulatory changes have positive impacts, with 
that at the country level being insignificant and that at the therapeutic class level significant.  
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
We now consider policy implications of our econometric findings by simulating the effects of 
various policy changes on class expenditures, and therefore on savings by therapeutic class, had certain 
counterfactual policies been adopted.  Since these policy changes involve altering the values of certain 
indicator or other variables, we compute savings in absolute expenditures as the difference in predicted 
prices with and without the counterfactual policies, multiplied by actual quantities.  Note that a more 
complete analysis would involve in addition the impact of the various policy changes on utilization 
quantities; given that we have data from eight countries in eleven therapeutic classes, the additional 
required modeling and estimation would be substantial, and therefore we leave that for future research.    
There are two sets of policy counterfactuals whose impacts on costs we will quantify:  (i) 
simulation of the case where all country-period markets were pharmacy driven, instead of some of them 
for varying time periods being physician driven; and (ii) simulating the cost effects if the regulatory and 
reimbursement changes that actually occurred since 2004 in various countries had not been 
implemented.    
A. Simulation of All Country-Periods Having Pharmacy Driven Market Environment 
For the US, UK and Netherlands, there is no difference between actual and counterfactual, since 
each of these countries was pharmacy driven during the entire study period. Note that since country 
specific effects and time effects are confounded with the pharmacy or physician driven characteristic, we 
cannot disentangle the effect of the pharmacy/physician driven market characteristic on the general 
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level of prices from other macroeconomic and regulatory events. However, because we have been able 
to show evidence on the differential effect of the pharmacy/physician driven market characteristic on 
the prices of drugs experiencing patent expiration, we can calculate the amount of savings that could 
have been realized had a country adopted regulatory rules making its market more pharmacy driven.  
This limits the savings to effects on the prices of drugs whose patents expire during our period of 
analysis. For France and Germany, we simulate the price at the drug level that would prevail had those 
countries always been pharmacy driven since 2004 instead of being pharmacy driven only after 2006 for 
France and only after 2007 for Germany. For Italy and Spain, the simulations yield cumulative savings 
estimates from being pharmacy driven during all of 2004-2010 instead of being physician driven over the 
full time interval. We simulate the price with a change in this market characteristic using specification (9) 
of Table 9. Once the counterfactual price is obtained by changing only this market characteristic, keeping 
everything else constant, we compute cumulative savings in US $ using observed quantities and 
assuming that these quantities would not change. Of course, as the characteristic “pharmacy driven 
market” has a larger negative impact on prices than “physician driven”, for those countries/time periods 
involving a switch from physician driven to pharmacy driven, positive savings will result. Assuming that 
quantities would not change even if prices decrease is a strong assumption, for it could be that quantities 
would increase and thus that savings would not be as large as what we obtain. However, these savings 
values are a useful benchmark; we present them in Table 11 in cumulative millions of dollars and as a 
proportion of cumulative total therapeutic class expenditures. [Place Table 11 somewhere near here] 
 The entries in Table 11 reveal that measured in absolute expenditures saved, in France the 
largest cumulative 2004-2005 savings would have occurred among antidepressants, followed closely by 
non-narcotic analgesics and anti-ulcerants; as a proportion of French therapeutic class expenditures, 
however, savings are largest for beta blockers, followed by non-narcotic analgesics and then 
antidepressants.  Altogether, in France the cumulative 2004-2005 savings had it been pharmacy rather 
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than physician driven 2004-2005 would have been about 119 million US$, at 0.84% less than one 
percent.  In the case of Germany, had it been pharmacy driven before 2007 cumulative 2004-2006 
absolute magnitudes savings  would have been largest for anti-ulcerants and lipid regulators, followed by 
the beta blockers and then ace inhibitors, in each case greater than 30 million US$; as a proportion of 
total class expenditures, savings would have been largest among the ace inhibitors and beta blockers, in 
each case being greater than two percent, whereas savings would have been greater than one percent 
among the calcium channel blockers, antidepressants, non-narcotics analgesics, lipid regulators, and 
antiulcerants.  Over all classes, total cumulative 2004-2006 savings for Germany would have been about 
1.3%.  For Italy, which has been physician driven for all seven years between 2004 and 2010, cumulative 
savings would have been much larger; in absolute expenditures, cumulative savings would have been 
largest for anti-ulcerants and antiplatelets, about 50 million US$ each, with proportional savings largest 
for antiplatelets (2.0%) and beta blockers (1.3%); over all 11 therapeutic classes, cumulative savings in 
Italy would have been more than 250 million US$, slightly less than 1% of total expenditures in these 
classes over the seven year time period.  Finally, for Spain, which was also physician driven for all years 
2004-2010, in absolute cumulative expenditures saved, amounts saved would have been largest among 
the antidepressants, anti-ulcerants and lipid regulators, in each case amounting to more than 50 million 
US$ ; as a proportion of total therapeutic class expenditures, cumulative savings would have been 
greatest for non-narcotic analgesics (2.1%), with savings among beta blockers, ace inhibitors, calcium 
channel blockers, antidepressants and anti-ulcerants each being between 1.5% and 2.0%.   Over all 11 
therapeutic classes, cumulative savings in Italy would have been about 367 million US$, constituting 
about 1.3% of total expenditures in these classes between 2004 and 2010.  
These savings may seem relatively modest.  Because we have country fixed effects, the 
simulations capture the savings only from being pharmacy rather than physician driven for those drugs 
losing patent protection over the 2004-2010 time period.  As seen in Table 9, column 9, while the 
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coefficient estimates on the expired*pharmacy driven and expired*physician driven interaction variables 
are both negative, the difference between them is rather small (-0.0879 for pharmacy driven and -0.0638 
for physician driven, a difference of only -0.0241 – about 2.4 percentage points). 
B. Simulation of Expenditures Had No Regulatory Changes Occurred since 2004 
Since the US and UK did not introduce any new price-related regulatory or reimbursement policy 
changes during 2004-2010, there is no relevant counterfactual simulation to be done for these countries.  
For the other countries, we can simulate the counterfactual prices again using parameter estimates in 
column (9) of Table 9, setting the class and country cumulative regulatory variables equal to zero for all 
country-time observations; actual values of these cumulative regulatory variables range from -7 to 2. 
Here the counterfactual situation is interpreted as not implementing any of the regulatory changes 
actually implemented during 2004-2010. Again, using the simulated prices, we compute the value of 
cumulative savings due to the change of regulation using the observed quantities, under the assumption 
that quantities would have been the same.  [Place Tables 12a and 12b somewhere near here] 
In Tables 12a and 12b, we present the value of these cumulative savings had price-related 
regulatory and reimbursement changes not taken place. In all countries except Canada, we find that 
because expenditures would have been higher without the regulations, the savings from these 
regulatory policies are positive; in Canada, however, regulatory changes increased expenditures overall 
by 0.8 percent, with the absolute cumulative expenditures for lipid regulators being just over $100 US 
million.  For countries like France and Germany the cumulative expenditure impacts of regulatory 
changes are very substantial, much greater than the effect from being pharmacy rather than physician 
driven.  For France, policy changes generated cumulative savings of 1.4 $US billion among the lipid 
regulators, and almost 1.2 $US billion for antiulcerants.  As a proportion of cumulative expenditures, in 
each therapeutic class cumulative savings were between 12% and 14%. Over the 11 therapeutic classes 
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selected, French policy changes resulted in cumulative savings of about 6.1 $US billion, on average about 
878 $US million annually. 
 Regulatory and reimbursement policies implemented in Germany 2004-2010 also resulted in 
substantial cumulative savings, averaging about 14% of total expenditures among the eleven therapeutic 
classes.  Absolute cumulative savings were largest among the anti-ulcerants at 1.1 $US billion, followed 
by the lipid regulators, antidepressants, antipsychotics and antiplatelets, each over 600 $US million.  
Over all therapeutic classes, German price-related regulatory and reimbursement policy changes 
resulted in cumulative savings of almost 5.1 $US billion, on average about 725 $US million annually.  
 Although still substantial at almost 3 $US billion (415 $US million annually), total cumulative 
savings in the eleven therapeutic classes from regulatory changes implemented in Italy 2004-2010 were 
considerably smaller than in France and Germany, and averaged about 10% over the eleven therapeutic 
classes; the two classes experiencing the greatest cumulative savings were lipid regulators and anti-
ulcerants.   
Regulatory policy changes implemented in Spain 2004-2010 resulted in more modest cumulative 
savings, both on an absolute basis (a total of about 1.3 $US billion, or 185 $US million annually) and 
proportional basis (between 4-5%), and were largest among the lipid regulators and antidepressants.  
Over the six countries in our sample implementing regulatory policies affecting prices 2004-2010, 
cumulative savings from these policies were smallest in the Netherlands, totaling 129 $US million over 
the seven year time period, and reducing expenditures among the eleven therapeutic classes by about 
2%. 
We conclude, therefore, that various price-related regulatory and reimbursement policies 
implemented 2004-2010 resulted in quite substantial cumulative savings in France, Germany and Italy.  
In Spain and especially in the Netherlands the cumulative savings, while positive, were quite small; 
notably, policy changes implemented in Canada actually increased expenditures.  Transitioning from 
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physician driven to pharmacy driven markets would also have resulted in savings, though for most 
countries the cumulative amounts saved would have been considerably smaller than cumulative savings 
attributable to implementing various price-related regulatory and reimbursement policies. 
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our goal in this research has been to provide insights into cross-country pharmaceutical cost 
comparisons by focusing on eleven therapeutic classes that between 2004 and 2010 experienced patent 
expiration and loss of market exclusivity in eight industrialized countries.  Average cost per day of 
treatment is computed over all versions of the molecule – brands, generics and branded generics – and is 
measured using the World Health Organization’s Defined Daily Dosage metrics.  Utilizing index number 
procedures consistent with the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics practices (treating brands and generic 
versions of the same molecule as perfect substitutes), we have calculated various price indexes.  We 
have also estimated econometric models at various levels of aggregation, quantifying the impacts on 
price indexes of daily treatment of generic entry, various national price-related regulatory and 
reimbursement policy changes, pharmacy/physician autonomy, and other factors, and then simulated 
the effects of alternative market environments and policy changes on expenditures by country/class. 
Among our eleven therapeutic classes, unweighted average costs of daily therapy by country 
differ considerably depending on whether the relatively low volume antinauseants are included.  In 
2004, 2007 and 2010, over ten classes (excluding antinauseants), the US and Canada are the highest 
average cost of daily therapy countries, whereas Germany and the UK are lowest; when antinauseants 
are included, Canada becomes the highest and Germany the third highest cost country.  An alternative 
summary of cost of daily treatment trends involves AAGRs (average annual growth rates) by therapeutic 
area and country.  Over the 2004-2010 time period, while most AAGRs are negative (reflecting in part 
the impacts of brands losing market exclusivity), positive AAGRs are clustered in three therapeutic 
classes – antipsychotics, non-narcotic analgesics (that in some countries include OTC products) and 
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antiplatelets.  Five of the eleven classes experienced double-digit declines in daily costs, averaged over 
all countries: ace inhibitors (-19%), the initially very high cost antinauseants (-14%), anti-ulcerants (-13%), 
calcium channel blockers (-12%) and lipid regulators (-11%), each of which experienced major patent 
expirations and generic entry.  When country-specific AAGRs are computed as unweighted averages of 
growth rates across therapeutic classes, the eight countries can be divided into two groups – one with 
very substantial daily treatment cost declines (Netherlands -15%, Germany -12%, UK -12% and US -9%), 
and the other group with more modest declines (France -4%, Canada -4%, Spain -5% and Italy -6%).  It is 
worth noting, however, that these cross-country cost comparisons are based on using November 2010 
exchange rates; in 2004, 2007 and 2010, foreign currency units per US $ fell for Canada from 1.302 to 
1.073 and 1.030, respectively; for the Euro it rose from 1.244 to 1.371 and then fell to 1.324; and for the 
British pound it initially increased from 1.833 to 2.002 and then fell to 1.544.  Hence Canadian and UK 
costs in US dollars were inflated by exchange rate developments, whereas for the EU countries costs 
were deflated by exchange rate trends.  These cross-country levels and AAGRs are therefore quite 
sensitive to weighting convention and exchange rate developments.  
 Econometric findings utilizing price indexes taking into account differential rates of utilization 
across therapeutic areas, countries and time based on chained Fisher price indexes generally reveal that 
following loss of patent protection, prices declines are larger in pharmacy than in physician driven 
markets; estimates on a time trend counter are typically negative and statistically significant as well.  
Index number issues can be avoided entirely by estimating models at the level of the individual molecule 
for each country and month.  When this is done, thereby greatly increasing the number of observations, 
we again find that monthly time trend estimates are negative and significant, while negative significant 
estimates on the expired*pharmacy driven variable are 50-100% larger in absolute value than on the 
expired*physician driven variable.  Unlike in the initial more aggregated models, when estimated at the 
Page 30 
 
level of the individual molecule, coefficient estimates on the cumulative country and therapeutic class 
price impact variables have the expected sign, although typically they are not statistically significant.    
When estimation occurs at an even lower level of aggregation – at the level of molecule 
formulation (e.g., strength, form, generic vs. brand, and OTC vs. Rx-only) with molecule fixed effects, 
estimates on the monthly time trend are negative and significant, and the negative estimate on the 
expired*pharmacy variable is larger than the negative estimate on the expired*physician variable, with 
only the former being statistically significant.  Moreover, parameter estimates imply that once a drug 
formulation encounters generic competition, other things equal, its price falls substantially immediately 
and increasingly as time passes.  In terms of the accumulated regulatory policy variables, in the fixed 
molecule effect specification the positive and significant coefficient at the therapeutic class level is 
greater than the positive estimate at the country level. 
Simulations  in which in all countries over all time periods have markets being pharmacy rather 
than physician driven result in cumulative savings ranging from 0.84% and 0.86% in France and Italy, to 
1.33-1.34% in Germany and Spain.  In interpreting these simulation results, it is worth noting that the 
model on which they are based includes country and molecule fixed effects, and therefore the only 
savings realized are those from a molecule going off patent during the 2004-2010 time period.  
Moreover, since the price data are based on ex-manufacturer invoices, they do not include possible 
differing wholesale and retail margins in pharmacy vs. physician driven markets.  In terms of the 
cumulative regulatory policy variables, in all countries except Canada price-related regulatory and 
reimbursement policy changes during the 2004-2010 time frame resulted in savings (in Canada, a very 
slight increase in total expenditures in the eleven therapeutic classes, less than 1%), savings substantially 
larger than those were all markets pharmacy rather than physician driven between 2004-2010.  The 
cumulative savings from these price-related regulatory and reimbursement policy changes range from 
129 $US million (1.8% of total) in the Netherlands, 1.3 $US billion (4.7% of total) in Spain and 2.9 $US 
Page 31 
 
billion (10.0%) in Italy, to a very substantial 5.1 $US billion (14% of total) in Germany and 6.1 $US billion 
(13% of total) in France; no major regulatory policy changes were implemented in the UK and the US 
during this time period.  In interpreting the Canadian and EU country savings, it is worth noting that 
between 2004 and 2010, the Canadian dollar strengthened by about 26% relative to the US dollar, 
whereas the Euro fell by about 6%.  
Finally, while this research presents clear evidence on the downward evolution of prices and 
thus countries’ drug expenditures for therapeutic classes experiencing patent expiration over the 2004-
2010 time period, further research needs to be done to assess how this evolution of costs has affected 
utilization if in any way. Such future research will contribute to understanding which regulatory, 
reimbursement and market policies are more cost-effective in limiting expenditures without penalizing 
health care quality. 
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Table 1 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 2 
COMPARISON OF US DAILY COST OF THERAPY BY THERAPEUTIC CLASS, 2006-2009 
BASED ON IMS HEALTH DACON AND WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION DDD MEASURES 
 
                                   Dollar Daily Cost IMS DACON        Dollar Daily Cost WHO DDD    DACON/DDD RATIO 
       Class                   2006     2007     2008     2009         2006     2007     2008     2009        2006      2009     
  
Antidepressants     $1.63   $1.43    $1.41    $1.31       $1.31   $1.14    $1.11    $1.01          1.22       1.30 
Antiplatelets             3.30     3.37       3.82      4.20          2.71     2.77      3.04      3.30          1.22       1.27 
Antipsychotics          6.72     7.18       7.68      7.42          8.98     9.67    10.45    10.89         0.75       0.68 
Beta Blockers           0.67     0.59       0.27      0.30          0.97     0.82      0.39       0.48         0.69        0.62 
Calcium Channel  
        Blockers            1.24     0.86       0.52      0.43           0.88     0.61      0.35       0.29        1.41        1.48 
Lipid Regulators      2.41    1.94        1.77      1.70           2.21     1.73      1.46       1.34         1.09       1.27 
Antiosteoporosis     2.24    2.34        2.16      2.10           2.25     2.38      1.75       1.49        1.00       1.41 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
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CANADA 
   
FRANCE   
Therapeutic Class 2004 2007 2010 
 
2004 2007 2010 
        Ace Inhibitors 0.4323 0.3363 0.2788 
 
0.5191 0.4034 0.3103 
Antiulcerants 1.6050 1.4750 1.0863 
 
1.5294 1.1360 0.7750 
Antidepressants 1.0237 0.9111 0.8923 
 
0.7555 0.6129 0.5627 
Antinauseants 38.3146 28.2146 25.0065 
 
20.3702 16.8510 9.9183 
Antiplatelets 2.1588 1.9199 2.2017 
 
2.1810 2.0816 1.1806 
Antipsychotics 5.0407 4.9649 3.7782 
 
2.5055 2.7305 2.7153 
Beta Blockers 0.4945 0.4785 0.4398 
 
0.3311 0.3295 0.3079 
Calcium Channel Blockers 1.0215 1.0220 0.6952 
 
0.5252 0.4338 0.3068 
Lipid Regulators 1.7327 1.5650 1.1958 
 
1.0123 0.7688 0.7255 
Non-Narcotic Analgesics 0.3427 0.4051 0.4245 
 
0.5475 0.5137 0.4986 
Antiosteoporosis 1.3205 1.1157 0.9792 
 
1.3221 1.0593 0.9697 
  
      
  
  
      
  
  
 
GERMANY 
   
ITALY   
Therapeutic Class 2004 2007 2010 
 
2004 2007 2010 
        Ace Inhibitors 0.1833 0.0491 0.0240 
 
0.3673 0.2671 0.1458 
Antiulcerants 1.2072 0.6848 0.3973 
 
1.3930 0.9131 0.6111 
Antidepressants 0.7994 0.6116 0.4664 
 
0.7649 0.5827 0.5162 
Antinauseants 32.8597 24.4701 18.5439 
 
21.1108 19.1345 12.7710 
Antiplatelets 1.3156 1.2266 1.1185 
 
0.9911 1.0727 1.0715 
Antipsychotics 1.9982 2.2722 1.8765 
 
2.9207 3.0644 3.2539 
Beta Blockers 0.3331 0.2374 0.1324 
 
0.3226 0.2984 0.2856 
Calcium Channel Blockers 0.2894 0.1167 0.0762 
 
0.4270 0.3885 0.2677 
Lipid Regulators 1.0316 0.4379 0.2768 
 
1.3307 0.9721 0.7361 
Non-Narcotic Analgesics 0.5912 0.5545 0.5109 
 
1.0948 1.0581 1.1146 
Antiosteoporosis 1.4796 1.1223 0.7754   1.2063 0.8636 0.8755 
  
Table 3 
Average Daily Cost of Treatment, by Country, Therapeutic Class, and Selected Years, in Dollars 
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    NETHERLANDS       SPAIN   
Therapeutic Class 2004 2007 2010 
 
2004 2007 2010 
  
       Ace Inhibitors 0.3385 0.2733 0.0469 
 
0.1988 0.1360 0.0904 
Antiulcerants 1.0015 0.8799 0.2753 
 
0.5378 0.4204 0.3120 
Antidepressants 0.7912 0.6464 0.2125 
 
0.7597 0.6859 0.5939 
Antinauseants 23.2530 16.6379 3.9232 
 
18.3570 14.6750 11.3698 
Antiplatelets 1.8975 1.7040 0.9194 
 
1.4163 1.5028 1.4491 
Antipsychotics 3.3376 3.6511 3.3231 
 
3.1692 3.1709 3.0646 
Beta Blockers 0.3387 0.3326 0.2018 
 
0.2739 0.2520 0.2373 
Calcium Channel Blockers 0.3692 0.3183 0.1709 
 
0.4967 0.4089 0.3308 
Lipid Regulators 0.9918 0.8958 0.4579 
 
1.0651 0.8666 0.6269 
Non-Narcotic Analgesics 0.6028 0.5056 0.3124 
 
0.4495 0.4229 0.3762 
Antiosteoporosis 1.3633 1.0261 0.4279 
 
1.2704 1.0636 0.9331 
  
      
  
  
 
UK 
   
US   
Therapeutic Class 2004 2007 2010 
 
2004 2007       2010 
  
       Ace Inhibitors 0.2662 0.1131 0.0440 
 
0.2236 0.1316 0.0344 
Antiulcerants 0.9653 0.3605 0.2101 
 
2.1954 2.0537 1.5149 
Antidepressants 0.6664 0.3988 0.2607 
 
1.3754 1.1398 1.0217 
Antinauseants 21.9333 18.7966 15.2268 
 
59.0559 28.9133 2.0729 
Antiplatelets 1.2311 1.4525 0.9091 
 
2.7247 2.7618 3.7252 
Antipsychotics 2.9063 3.5701 3.4187 
 
7.8807 9.6638 12.1482 
Beta Blockers 0.1978 0.2122 0.2042 
 
0.7686 0.8372 0.4976 
Calcium Channel Blockers 0.4939 0.2356 0.1517 
 
0.8361 0.6021 0.2570 
Lipid Regulators 1.1065 0.4503 0.3417 
 
2.2867 1.7361 1.3290 
Non-Narcotic Analgesics 0.3404 0.4280 0.3605 
 
0.2594 0.3142 0.3205 
Antiosteoporosis 1.1562 0.5711 0.2594   2.0718 2.3769 1.5697 
 
  
Table 3 (Continued) 
Average Daily Cost of Treatment, by Country, Therapeutic Area, and Selected Years, in Dollars 
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                                                                            Table 4  
 
        Unweighted Mean Daily Cost of Therapy Across Therapeutic Classes, Selected Years 
 
                                    Over Ten Classes*                                   Over All Classes* 
 
                              2004        2007        2010                          2004       2007        2010       
Canada             $1.517     $1.419     $1.197                     $4.862     $3.855     $3.362    
France                1.123        1.007       0.835                       2.873        2.448       1.661  
Germany           0.923        0.731        0.565                       3.826       2.889       2.200 
Italy                    1.082        0.948       0.888                        2.903       2.601       1.968       
Netherlands     1.103        1.023        0.635                        3.117       2.443       0.934  
Spain                 0.964        0.893        0.801                        2.545       2.146       1.762   
UK                      0.933        0.779        0.616                        2.842       2.417       1.944   
US                      2.062        2.162        2.242                        7.244       4.594       2.226    
 
*”Ten Classes” excludes the antinauseants, “All Classes” includes them 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                Table 5 
 
2004-2010 Average Annual Growth Rates by Therapeutic Area, Country, and Overall, in Percent 
            
                                     CAN      FRA      GER         ITA       NET       SPA       UK        US          ALL       
Ace Inhibitors           -7.05    -8.22   -28.74   -14.27   -28.07  -12.31  -25.92  -26.80     -18.92 
Antiulcerants            -6.30  -10.71  -16.91    -12.83  -19.36    -8.68   -22.44    -6.00     -12.90 
Antidepressants       -2.26    -4.79    -8.59      -6.34   -19.68    -4.02   -14.48    -4.83       -8.17 
Antinauseants          -6.86    -8.45    -9.09      -8.04   -25.66    -7.67     -5.90  -42.78     -14.31 
Antiplatelets             0.30    -9.72    -2.67       1.31   -11.38     0.38     -4.93      5.35       -2.67 
Antipsychotics          -4.69     1.35     -1.04      1.82     -0.07    -0.56      2.74      7.48         0.88 
Beta Blockers            -1.93    -1.20  -14.25     -2.01     -8.27    -2.36      0.53     -6.99       -4.56 
Calcium Channel 
       Blockers              -6.21    -8.57   -19.94    -7.49    -12.05    -6.55  -17.86  -17.85     -12.06 
Lipid Regulators       -6.00    -5.40    -19.69    -9.40   -12.09    -8.45  -17.79     -8.65     -10.93 
Non-narcotic 
      Analgesics             3.63    -1.55     -2.40      0.30   -10.38    -2.92      0.96      3.59      -1.10 
Antiosteoporosis      -4.86    -5.04   -10.21    -5.20   -17.56    -5.01   -22.05    -4.52      -9.31 
 
Mean Growth Rates: 
 
All Classes                 -3.84    -3.72   -12.13     -5.65   -14.96    -5.29   -11.56    -9.27     -8.55 
Ten Classes*             -3.54    -3.24   -12.44     -5.41   -13.83    -5.05   -12.12    -5.92     -7.97 
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*”Ten Classes” excludes the antinauseants 
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Table 6: Regressions with Fisher Chained Indices 
Therapeutic Class Level of Aggregation, Country*-Class Fixed Effects 
OLS (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑘𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑘𝑛𝑡 
   
Time trend (monthly) -0.000567*** -0.000559*** 
 (0.000148) (0.000148) 
sh_expired -0.0259  
 (0.0171)  
sh_expired_pharma  -0.0330* 
  (0.0193) 
sh_expired_physic  -0.0188 
  (0.0173) 
Regulatory Changes   
ac_price_impact -0.00768* -0.00693* 
 (0.00401) (0.00408) 
ac_price_impact_tcl 0.00369 0.00210 
 (0.00238) (0.00278) 
Constant 0.0211** 0.0215** 
 (0.00851) (0.00840) 
Observations 7,095 7,095 
R-squared 0.028 0.029 
Country-Class FE Yes Yes 
Standard errors clustered by country-class 
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Table 7: Regressions with Fisher (fixed US January 2004 = 1.000 basis) Indices 
Fixed Effects by Country and Class, not Country*Class 
Therapeutic Class Level of Aggregation 
OLS (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑘𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑘𝑛𝑡 
   
Time trend (monthly) -0.01000*** -0.00997*** 
 (0.00176) (0.00176) 
sh_expired -0.937***  
 (0.137)  
sh_expired_pharma  -0.981*** 
  (0.208) 
sh_expired_physic  -0.865*** 
  (0.0982) 
Regulatory Changes   
ac_price_impact -0.0464* -0.0399 
 (0.0214) (0.0246) 
ac_price_impact_tcl 0.0197 0.00675 
 (0.0135) (0.0281) 
Country Dummies (reference is US)   
CANADA 0.0121 0.0107 
 (0.161) (0.160) 
FRANCE -0.286 -0.326* 
 (0.169) (0.175) 
GERMANY -0.549** -0.622* 
 (0.207) (0.280) 
ITALY -0.495** -0.566** 
 (0.221) (0.252) 
NETHERLANDS -0.642*** -0.640*** 
 (0.194) (0.196) 
SPAIN -0.727*** -0.790*** 
 (0.196) (0.201) 
UK -0.770*** -0.767*** 
 (0.203) (0.204) 
Constant 0.404** 0.432* 
 (0.180) (0.197) 
Observations 7,183 7,183 
R-squared 0.502 0.503 
Class FE Yes Yes 
Standard errors clustered by country-class 
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Table 8: Results from Estimation with Observations at the Molecule Level 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑖𝑛𝑡 
Time trend (monthly) 
-0.000169 -0.000288 -0.000272 -0.000301 -0.000179 -0.000169 -0.00244*** -0.00204*** -0.00200*** 
 
(0.000866) (0.000877) (0.000859) (0.000891) (0.000879) (0.000857) (0.000790) (0.000770) (0.000761) 
Expired 
-0.744*** -0.853*** 
 
-0.787*** -0.668*** 
 
-0.455*** -0.363*** 
 
 
(0.155) (0.121) 
 
(0.120) (0.154) 
 
(0.0613) (0.0653) 
 
Expired*pharmacy driven 
  
-0.962*** 
  
-0.787*** 
  
-0.444*** 
   
(0.129) 
  
(0.162) 
  
(0.0726) 
Expired*physician driven 
  
-0.658*** 
  
-0.463*** 
  
-0.254*** 
   
(0.128) 
  
(0.151) 
  
(0.0615) 
Off_pat_mth 
-0.00109* 
   
-0.00117* -0.00111 
 
-0.00173*** -0.00167*** 
 
(0.000654) 
   
(0.000688) (0.000686) 
 
(0.000537) (0.000535) 
Off_month_unknown 
-0.361* 
   
-0.466** -0.498** 
 
-0.379** -0.399** 
 
(0.201) 
   
(0.188) (0.192) 
 
(0.156) (0.155) 
OTC dummy 
-0.0609 -0.0641 -0.0580 0.0170 0.0204 0.0245 -0.0871 -0.102 -0.0919 
 
(0.151) (0.151) (0.150) (0.143) (0.139) (0.137) (0.324) (0.310) (0.306) 
Generic dummy 
-0.248 -0.486*** -0.471*** -0.570*** -0.237 -0.189 -0.290*** -0.0948 -0.0601 
 
(0.193) (0.113) (0.111) (0.115) (0.191) (0.191) (0.0876) (0.139) (0.138) 
Regulatory Changes 
         
ac_price_impact 
-0.0147 -0.0168 -0.00207 -0.0163 -0.0140 0.00221 -0.00513 -0.00443 0.00451 
 
(0.0153) (0.0154) (0.0166) (0.0147) (0.0145) (0.0156) (0.00711) (0.00705) (0.00654) 
ac_price_impact_tcl 
0.0353** 0.0352** -0.00416 0.0366** 0.0366** -0.00534 0.0324*** 0.0321*** 0.00756 
 
(0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0176) (0.0157) (0.0156) (0.0175) (0.00661) (0.00658) (0.00937) 
Therapeutic Classes Dummies (Reference is Osteoporosis) 
       Ace Inhibitors  -1.280*** -1.262*** -1.250*** 
       (0.147) (0.148) (0.146) 
      Anti-Ulcerants  -0.270** -0.271** -0.266** 
       (0.110) (0.112) (0.113) 
      Antidepressants  -0.350*** -0.373*** -0.365*** 
       (0.103) (0.105) (0.105) 
      Antinauseants  2.791*** 2.801*** 2.814*** 
       (0.121) (0.121) (0.121) 
      Antiplatelets  0.314** 0.285* 0.277* 
       (0.141) (0.144) (0.142) 
      Antipsychotics 0.512*** 0.500*** 0.503*** 
       (0.128) (0.126) (0.127) 
      Beta Blockers  -0.579*** -0.625*** -0.617*** 
       (0.120) (0.116) (0.119) 
      Calcium Channel Blockers  -0.603*** -0.614*** -0.605*** 
       (0.130) (0.132) (0.133) 
      Lipid Regulators  -0.311*** -0.320*** -0.324*** 
       (0.110) (0.112) (0.111) 
      Non-Narcotic_Analgesics  0.0861 0.0515 0.0476 
      
 
(0.154) (0.152) (0.149) 
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Table 8: Continued 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Country Dummies (Ref is US) 
        
CANADA 
0.122 0.115 0.113 
   
0.145 0.150 0.147 
 
(0.127) (0.128) (0.126) 
   
(0.102) (0.102) (0.102) 
FRANCE 
-0.313** -0.322** -0.448*** 
   
-0.317*** -0.306*** -0.387*** 
 
(0.146) (0.142) (0.148) 
   
(0.112) (0.110) (0.0986) 
GERMANY 
-0.356*** -0.369*** -0.597*** 
   
-0.295*** -0.273*** -0.417*** 
 
(0.122) (0.118) (0.140) 
   
(0.0911) (0.0898) (0.0723) 
ITALY 
-0.364*** -0.380*** -0.613*** 
   
-0.363*** -0.360*** -0.504*** 
 
(0.136) (0.135) (0.160) 
   
(0.104) (0.105) (0.0808) 
NETHERLANDS 
-0.410*** -0.397*** -0.396*** 
   
-0.398*** -0.410*** -0.410*** 
 
(0.117) (0.115) (0.114) 
   
(0.0989) (0.0980) (0.0979) 
SPAIN 
-0.373*** -0.393*** -0.604*** 
   
-0.456*** -0.431*** -0.561*** 
 
(0.117) (0.115) (0.148) 
   
(0.109) (0.109) (0.0871) 
UK 
-0.382*** -0.399*** -0.393*** 
   
-0.427*** -0.398*** -0.395*** 
 
(0.116) (0.112) (0.110) 
   
(0.0900) (0.0885) (0.0887) 
Constant 
1.064*** 1.084*** 1.152*** 0.574*** 0.579*** 0.559*** 0.547*** 0.586*** 0.636*** 
 
(0.127) (0.123) (0.126) (0.0737) (0.0730) (0.0684) (0.0838) (0.0864) (0.0804) 
          Observations 205,113 205,113 205,113 205,113 205,113 205,113 205,113 205,113 205,113 
R-squared 
0.501 0.499 0.502 0.219 0.225 0.230 0.149 0.158 0.161 
Molecule Fixed Effect No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Class Fixed Effect No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No 
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Table 9: Results from Estimation with Observations at the Specific Molecule Formulation (Drug) Level  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES logpint
 
logpint
 
logpint
 
logpint
 
logpint
 
logpint
 
logpint
 
logpint
 
logpint
 
Time trend (monthly) 
0.000462 0.000354 0.000356 0.000300 0.000397 0.000400 -0.00155** -0.00129** -0.00129** 
 
(0.000771) (0.000789) (0.000786) (0.000787) (0.000767) (0.000763) (0.000613) (0.000591) (0.000590) 
Expired 
-0.452*** -0.533***  -0.488*** -0.412***  -0.132*** -0.0797*  
 
(0.131) (0.113)  (0.115) (0.132)  (0.0376) (0.0414)  
Expired*pharmacy 
driven 
  -0.572***   -0.458***   -0.0879* 
 
  (0.123)   (0.143)   (0.0460) 
Expired*physician 
driven 
  -0.449***   -0.316**   -0.0638 
 
  (0.115)   (0.126)   (0.0421) 
Off_pat_mth 
-0.000968**    -0.000917** -0.000908**  -0.00105*** -0.00105*** 
 
(0.000441)    (0.000453) (0.000454)  (0.000357) (0.000357) 
Off_month_unknown 
-0.371***    -0.412*** -0.412***  -0.305*** -0.305*** 
 
(0.136)    (0.104) (0.105)  (0.0726) (0.0727) 
OTC dummy 
-0.146 -0.151 -0.148 -0.0662 -0.0607 -0.0587 -0.0785 -0.0876 -0.0870 
 
(0.172) (0.170) (0.170) (0.147) (0.149) (0.148) (0.212) (0.212) (0.212) 
Generic dummy 
-0.437*** -0.704*** -0.703*** -0.736*** -0.423*** -0.421*** -0.673*** -0.476*** -0.476*** 
 
(0.123) (0.106) (0.106) (0.107) (0.0971) (0.0988) (0.0409) (0.0710) (0.0711) 
ac_price_impact 
0.0144 0.0138 0.0197 0.0133 0.0139 0.0209 0.0235*** 0.0231*** 0.0243*** 
 
(0.0141) (0.0144) (0.0159) (0.0134) (0.0130) (0.0145) (0.00584) (0.00585) (0.00603) 
ac_price_impact_tcl 
0.0447*** 0.0448*** 0.0278 0.0468*** 0.0465*** 0.0268* 0.0429*** 0.0426*** 0.0393*** 
 
(0.0162) (0.0165) (0.0168) (0.0162) (0.0160) (0.0161) (0.00666) (0.00660) (0.00839) 
Therapeutic Classes Dummies (Reference is Osteoporosis) 
      Ace Inhibitors  -1.259*** -1.247*** -1.245*** 
       (0.153) (0.155) (0.156) 
      Anti-Ulcerants  -0.244* -0.249* -0.248* 
       (0.134) (0.137) (0.138) 
      Antidepressants  -0.335*** -0.358*** -0.357*** 
       (0.122) (0.124) (0.125) 
      Antinauseants  2.800*** 2.807*** 2.810*** 
       (0.144) (0.144) (0.145) 
      Antiplatelets  0.249 0.222 0.219 
       (0.158) (0.161) (0.161) 
      Antipsychotics  0.473*** 0.461*** 0.461*** 
       (0.137) (0.137) (0.139) 
      Beta Blockers  -0.637*** -0.689*** -0.688*** 
       (0.134) (0.138) (0.140) 
      Calcium Channel 
Blockers 
-0.662*** -0.683*** -0.682*** 
       (0.134) (0.137) (0.138) 
      Lipid Regulators  -0.263** -0.265** -0.267** 
       (0.120) (0.121) (0.122) 
      Non-Narcotic 
Analgesics  
0.0144 -0.00807 -0.00997 
      
 
(0.182) (0.184) (0.184) 
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Table 9 continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Country Dummies (Reference is US) 
      
CANADA 
-0.128 -0.130 -0.131 
   
-0.0947 -0.0940 -0.0944 
 
(0.105) (0.107) (0.106) 
   
(0.0837) (0.0835) (0.0833) 
FRANCE 
-0.595*** -0.605*** -0.662*** 
   
-0.600*** -0.591*** -0.603*** 
 
(0.136) (0.135) (0.136) 
   
(0.102) (0.101) (0.0924) 
GERMANY 
-0.686*** -0.689*** -0.789*** 
   
-0.607*** -0.598*** -0.618*** 
 
(0.105) (0.103) (0.117) 
   
(0.0785) (0.0776) (0.0644) 
ITALY 
-0.670*** -0.666*** -0.770*** 
   
-0.666*** -0.673*** -0.694*** 
 
(0.125) (0.124) (0.143) 
   
(0.0938) (0.0945) (0.0748) 
NETHERLANDS 
-0.780*** -0.760*** -0.761*** 
   
-0.737*** -0.750*** -0.750*** 
 
(0.103) (0.103) (0.103) 
   
(0.0875) (0.0868) (0.0866) 
SPAIN 
-0.720*** -0.715*** -0.808*** 
   
-0.806*** -0.803*** -0.821*** 
 
(0.104) (0.104) (0.127) 
   
(0.0959) (0.0964) (0.0795) 
UK 
-0.691*** -0.711*** -0.709*** 
   
-0.719*** -0.698*** -0.697*** 
 
(0.0954) (0.0927) (0.0927) 
   
(0.0795) (0.0785) (0.0787) 
Constant 
1.304*** 1.319*** 1.349*** 0.489*** 0.492*** 0.482*** 0.734*** 0.757*** 0.763*** 
 
(0.140) (0.138) (0.142) (0.0696) (0.0688) (0.0664) (0.0643) (0.0641) (0.0596) 
          
Observations 302,595 302,595 302,595 302,595 302,595 302,595 302,595 302,595 302,595 
R-squared 
0.505 0.501 0.502 0.227 0.233 0.234 0.280 0.285 0.285 
Molecule Fixed Effect No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Class Fixed Effect No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Standard errors clustered by country-class 
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Table 10: Results from Estimation with Observations at the Molecule Formulation (Drug) Level  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES logpint logpint logpint logpint           Time trend (monthly) 0.000324 0.000328 0.000397 0.000402  (0.000778) (0.000772) (0.000768) (0.000762) Expired -0.450***  -0.406***   (0.130)  (0.134)  Expired*pharmacy driven -0.508***  -0.471***   (0.140)  (0.142) Expired*physician driven -0.327**  -0.264*   (0.128)  (0.141) Off month*unknown -0.414*** -0.415*** -0.415*** -0.417***  (0.107) (0.108) (0.103) (0.105) OTC -0.0630 -0.0601 -0.0601 -0.0569  (0.142) (0.141) (0.149) (0.148) generic -0.384*** -0.382*** -0.423*** -0.421***  (0.0921) (0.0940) (0.0957) (0.0973) Interactions country dummy with  off  h      CANADA*off patent months -0.000921 -0.000868    (0.000673) (0.000678)   FRANCE*off patent months -0.00208** -0.00207**    (0.000819) (0.000821)   GERMANY*off patent months -0.00118** -0.00118**    (0.000531) (0.000533)   ITALY*off patent months -0.000209 -0.000551    (0.000738) (0.000750)   NETHERLANDS*off patent months -0.00176** -0.00171**    (0.000766) (0.000770)   SPAIN*off patent months -0.00306** -0.00323**    (0.00130) (0.00132)   UK*off patent months -0.00216*** -0.00212***    (0.000653) (0.000657)   USA*off patent months 0.00609*** 0.00616***    (0.00117) (0.00117)   Pharmacy*off patent months -0.000724 -0.000633    (0.000478) (0.000490) Physician*off patent months -0.00178** -0.00211***    (0.000685) (0.000736) Regulatory changes    ac_price_impact 0.0100 0.0187 0.0117 0.0211  (0.0129) (0.0145) (0.0129) (0.0143) ac_price_impact_tcl 0.0444*** 0.0193 0.0543*** 0.0289*  (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0181) (0.0166) Constant 0.497*** 0.482*** 0.497*** 0.484***  (0.0700) (0.0670) (0.0681) (0.0660) Observations 302,595 302,595 302,595 302,595 R-squared 0.269 0.271 0.234 0.236 Country-Class Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors clustered by country-class 
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Table 11: Cumulative Savings in Million $ US and as Percent of Total Therapeutic Class Expenditures if 
Country was a pharmacy driven market during 2004-2010 (for France and Germany, cumulative 
savings due to changes only before 2006 and 2007, respectively) 
Savings FRANCE 
(2004-2005) 
GERMANY 
(2004-2006) 
ITALY SPAIN 
Therapeutic 
Class 
Million 
US $ 
% 
Expenses 
Million 
US $ 
% 
Expenses 
Million 
US $ 
% 
Expenses 
Million 
US $ 
% 
Expenses 
Ace Inhibitors 3,69 0,38 30,26 2,24 27,22 1,12 17,86 1,94 
Anti-Ulcerants 22,19 0,78 39,79 1,10 53,39 0,92 60,21 1,52 
Antidepressants 25,70 1,69 27,64 1,55 27,28 1,03 73,28 1,66 
Antinauseants 0,00 0,00 0,26 0,47 0,75 0,81 0,79 1,44 
Antiplatelets 0,66 0,06 11,76 0,61 49,39 2,01 40,79 1,34 
Antipsychotics 4,24 0,62 8,64 0,58 5,22 0,36 14,67 0,50 
Beta Blockers 14,89 2,23 34,46 2,01 20,86 1,31 11,37 1,99 
Calcium 
Channel 
Blockers 8,78 0,89 23,18 1,95 26,60 0,92 32,58 1,81 
Lipid Regulators 12,34 0,36 38,29 1,36 18,79 0,32 54,03 0,95 
Non-Narcotic 
Analgesics 22,86 2,00 17,30 1,47 14,20 1,10 43,61 2,11 
Osteoporosis 3,55 0,50 6,26 0,95 7,26 0,57 18,28 0,89 
Total 118,89 0,84 237,83 1,33 250,95 0,86 367,46 1,34 
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Table 12a: Cumulative savings (increased expenditure if negative) in Million $ US during 2004-2010 if 
Country had not changed regulatory policies since 2004 
Therapeutic Class CANADA FRANCE GERMANY 
 Million 
US $ 
% 
Expenses 
Million 
US $ 
% 
Expenses 
Million US 
$ 
% 
Expenses 
Ace Inhibitors -28,40 -0,72 378,66 12,89 212,89 11,06 
Antiulcerants -59,72 -0,82 1158,00 12,86 1131,50 15,35 
Antidepressants -43,11 -0,75 617,96 13,11 640,99 16,28 
Antinauseants -1,11 -0,67 23,58 11,55 25,94 18,07 
Antiplatelets -16,66 -0,66 605,18 13,60 613,39 14,54 
Antipsychotics -22,58 -0,71 385,55 14,54 615,92 16,62 
Beta Blockers -9,90 -0,78 340,62 14,08 422,79 13,87 
Calcium Channel Blockers -41,78 -0,93 405,80 12,84 240,88 12,57 
Lipid Regulators -104,25 -0,89 1425,54 13,30 680,72 13,51 
Non-Narcotic Analgesics -9,45 -0,66 551,40 12,75 303,94 11,29 
Osteoporosis 14,32 -0,85 254,87 12,73 183,00 14,47 
Total 351,27 -0,81 6147,16 13,19 5071,94 14,38 
 
Table 12b: Cumulative savings (increased expenditure if negative) in Million $ US during 2004-2010 if 
Country had not changed regulatory policies since 2004 
Therapeutic Class ITALY NETHERLANDS SPAIN 
 Million US 
$ 
% Expenses Million US $ % 
Expenses 
Million 
US $ 
% 
Expenses 
Ace Inhibitors 274,70 9,51 3,59 0,87 33,72 3,60 
Antiulcerants 619,07 10,25 26,88 1,67 185,22 4,69 
Antidepressants 263,14 9,91 8,06 1,14 209,62 4,75 
Antinauseants 11,90 9,49 0,39 1,04 2,38 4,23 
Antiplatelets 271,98 11,07 12,71 2,40 152,53 5,02 
Antipsychotics 160,87 11,12 15,19 2,50 137,75 4,84 
Beta Blockers 163,70 10,33 10,38 2,11 27,16 4,75 
Calcium Channel Blockers 316,78 9,70 6,70 1,70 77,23 4,27 
Lipid Regulators 624,19 10,41 39,62 1,90 269,41 4,71 
Non-Narcotic Analgesics 66,69 5,15 1,41 2,30 93,81 4,55 
Osteoporosis 134,05 10,39 4,36 1,47 100,49 4,79 
Total 2907,05 10,01 129,28 1,79 1289,31 4,69 
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Appendix A:  
Regulatory, Reimbursement, Patient Copayment, and Related Policy Event Data 
 
Information on regulatory change events is coded qualitatively to evaluate whether they have an impact 
on prices and whether the impact is of the expected sign.  Data are taken from the IMS Health MIDAS™ 
database product.  
 
Country Impact Date 
Expected Price 
Impact on 
Global Market 
(-1,0,+1) 
 
Canada 
Maximum list price of new generics set at 42% and existing 
generics at 50% of originator drug in British Columbia 
oct-10 
-1 
 
Canada Ontario cuts generic prices by 25% apr-10 -1 
Canada 
Maximum list price of new generics at 45% and existing 
generics at 56% of originator drug in Alberta 
febr-10 
-1 
Canada 
Quebec lifts price freeze for first time in 13 years over 
concern that products will be removed from the provincial 
formulary if price increases are not permitted 
jan-07 
+1 
 
France 
Cost containment measures put in place by Commission: 
Delisting of drugs currently reimbursed  at 35% to 15%; 
fixed co-payment for chronic disease patients; annual 
deductible for healthcare costs 
august-10 
0 
 
France 
Parallel import price cuts of 5% off manufacturer's selling 
price 
june-10 
-1 
 
France 
Generic Price Cuts: New generics must be priced at 55% (up 
from 50%) below MSP; after being on the market for 18 
months these new generics will be cut 7% (up from 4%) and 
the off-patent original by 12.5% (up from 10%) 
sept-08 
-1 
 
France 
Non-reimbursed drug prices agreement signed: 
manufacturers must set the prices at a level which will 
ensure all patients may access them and pharmacists must 
apr-08 
0 
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ensure prices prices are transparent 
France 
206 off-patent branded products and generics experience 
price cuts ranging from 4-15% off the ex-manufacturer 
selling price 
febr-08 
-1 
 
France 
Price increase for veintonics - almost doubled as a result of 
being delisted -VAT is roughly 3.4% higher for 
nonreimbursed drugs 
jan-08 
+1 
 
France 
Therapeutic off-patent price referencing to cut patented 
drug prices 
oct-06 
0 
 
France 
Drugs delisted in March 2006 haveprice  increased on 
average by 110% 
oct-06 
+1 
 
France 
In addition to the 15% price cuts planned for Feb 2006 for 
all generics (an additional 4% will be cut) and their 
corresponding original off-patent products (additional 10% 
will be cut). New generics will be required to be priced at 
50% below the branded drug instead of 40-50% lower 
starting Jan 2006. 
dec-05 
-1 
 
Spain 
The CIPM raised the minimum price difference required for 
the first generic to 40% (from 30%) below the ex-factory 
price of the original brand 
july-10 
-1 
 
Spain 
Retail price cuts ranging from 0-30% and revised prices for 
generic products take effect 15 days after the April 17th 
publication.  
apr-10 
-1 
 
Spain Update to reference price system oct-09 0 
 
Spain 
New "cheapest price" list implemented. Will be updated 
annually. 
july-09 
0 
 
Spain Update to reference price system march-08 0 
 
Spain 
New reference price order setup in Mar-07 causes Spanish 
regions to stop applying regional max price reimbursement 
systems 
apr-07 
0 
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Spain 
269 reference priced presentations delisted after 
interpretation error over the new reference price order. 
Manufacturers thought the Health Ministry would 
automatically reduce the prices of their products with no 
identical alternatives, but the government was expecting to 
receive the new prices. 
march-07 
0 
 
Spain 
Andalucia updates the reference price list effective Jan 
2006. 129 presentations will decrease while 5 will increase. 
jan 06 
-1 
 
Spain 
Ex-manufacturer selling prices of almost 4,500 medicines 
marketed for over one year will be cut by 4.2% in 2005 and 
by 2% in 2006 
jan-05 
-1 
Italy 
Generics subject to 12.5% public price cuts effective June 
2010 
july-10 
-1 
 
Italy 
Generics subject to 12% public price cuts effective May 
2009 
june-09 
-1 
Italy 
Premium prices for products manufactured by companies 
with R&D/production sites in Italy 
nov-08 
0 
Italy Price cuts to be extended into 2007 sept-06 0 
 
Italy 
New price cuts of 0.6% on public price to cover the 2005 
pharmaceutical overspend 
july-06 
-1 
 
Italy 4.4% price cuts on public price jan-06 -1 
 
Germany Price freeze on all reimbursed drugs august-10 -1 
 
Germany 
Two-year price freeze on all pharmaceuticals ends as 
scheduled 
march-08 
+1 
 
Germany New reference prices for eight new reference price groups july-07 0 
 
Germany The prices of more than 1,600 products were reduced febr-05 -1 
 
Germany 
Member companies of the generics association Pro 
Generika (accounting for 90% of generic sales) voluntarily 
pledge to implement a price freeze on prescription generis 
until Dec 31, 2005 
jan-05 
0 
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Netherlands 
Preference policy has led generic manufactures to cut their 
pharmacy purchase prices by an average of 85% within the 
official price list for June 2008 in order to remain 
competitive 
may-08 
-1 
 
 
 
Therapeutic Area Country Impact Date 
Expected 
Price 
Impact 
Lipid Regulators Germany 
The SK has decided on new reference prices for statins 
effective January 1, 2005. 
nov-04 -1 
ACE inhibitors 
Antiulcerant 
Antidepressant 
France 
Generic price cuts of the branded and generic versions of 
enalapril  
reduced by roughly 14%; omeprazole generic versions 
extended from roughly 32% to 41%   
cheaper than the off-patent drug; fluoxetine generics 
extended from 31.5% to 39% cheaper. 
febr-05 
-1 
Lipid Regulators 
ACE Inhibitors 
Antiulcerants 
Italy 
The AIFA has approved the revised reimbursement list, 
effective Jan. 1, 2005. The revision comprises a price 
reduction for those drugs which in 2004 have registered 
sales increases in excess of 8.6%. (statins, proton pump 
inhibitors, sartans, diuretics and acid inhibitors are 
among those hit by price cuts) 
jan 05 -1 
Lipid Regulators Germany 
16 regional associations of AOKs have signed a 
comprehensive discount agreement on selected drugs - 
including ACE inhibitors, statins, calcium antagonists and 
proton pump inhibitors - with 11 generic manufacturers 
févr-07 -1 
Lipid Regulators France 
Targeted drug price cuts will be implemented in autumn 
2010 and will primarily affect sartans, erythropoietins, 
anti-TNF-alpha therapies and high-dose statins 
juen-07 -1 
Lipid Regulators France 
Targeted price cuts planned for autumn. The price cuts 
will primarily affect "sartans, erythropoietins, anti-TNF-
alpha therapies and high-dose statins 
June 10 -1 
Lipid Regulators Germany 
Comprehensive rebate deal covering 82 active 
ingredients expected to take effect in 2008 and last for 2 
years 
july-07 -1 
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Lipid Regulators France 
Price cuts for patented medicines in therapeutic classes 
where a generic exists were published on Nov 29, 2006. 
In total 12 active ingredients corresponding to six 
therapeutic classes will be impacted, including PPIs, 
statins, anti-histamines, anti-depressants, ACE inhibitors 
and prostatic hypertrophy treatments. Price cuts will 
reach up to 15%. 
dec-06 -1 
Lipid Regulators 
Netherlan
ds 
Effective January 1, 2009, physicians need to start new 
statin patients on the preferred off-patent drugs, 
simvastatin or pravastatin to ensure reimbursement. This 
preference policy led to massive generic price cuts. 
jan 09 -1 
Lipid Regulators Spain 
Andalucia has reintroduced a regional max price 
reimbursement scheme for atorvastatin. 
Feb 10 -1 
Antiulcerants Germany 
The SK has decided on new reference prices for statins 
effective January 1, 2005. 
nov-04 -1 
Specific Drugs France 
Zocor (simvastatin) will have its price reduced by 6-
7%, depending on the dosage in May 2005. Generic 
versions of the simvastatin drug will now be 
required to be even cheaper. 
march-
05 
-1 
Antiulcerants 
Antidepressants 
Italy 
A temporary and selected reduction of drug prices 
effective Jul 2006 include reductions up to 10% for 
proton pump inhibitors, corticosteroids, NSAIDs, anti-
asthmatics, anti-epileptics and SSRI antidepressants. 
july-06 -1 
Antiulcerants 
Lipid regulators 
Antidepressants 
Ace inhibitor 
France 
Price cuts for patented medicines in therapeutic classes 
where a generic exists were published on Nov 29, 2006. 
In total 12 active ingredients corresponding to six 
therapeutic classes will be impacted, including PPIs, 
statins, anti-histamines, anti-depressants, ACE inhibitors 
and prostatic hypertrophy treatments. Price cuts will 
reach up to 15%. 
dec-06 -1 
Antiulcerants 
Ace inhibitors 
Calcium channel 
blockers 
Germany 
16 regional associations of AOKs have signed a 
comprehensive discount agreement on selected drugs - 
including ACE inhibitors, statins, calcium antagonists and 
proton pump inhibitors - with 11 generic manufacturers 
febr-07 -1 
Antiulcerants Italy 
Disagreement over the legal status of the regional 
therapeutic reference pricing systems for the proton 
pump inhibitors. 
june-07 0 
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Antipsychotics Germany 
The Federal Association o f Health Insurance Funds has 
set reference prices for the new level 2 
(pharmacologically/therapeutically comparable active 
ingredients) group, other antipsychotics. This reference 
group consists of Invega and off-patent risperidone. 
Invega will not lower its price to the reference price level 
because it would result in an 85% price cut. 
sept-09 -1 
Antidepressants 
Antiulcerants 
Italy 
A temporary and selected reduction of drug prices 
effective Jul 2006 include reductions up to 10% for 
proton pump inhibitors, corticosteroids, NSAIDs, anti-
asthmatics, anti-epileptics and SSRI antidepressants. 
july-06 -1 
Antidepressants France 
Price cuts for patented medicines in therapeutic classes 
where a generic exists were published on Nov 29, 2006. 
In total 12 active ingredients corresponding to six 
therapeutic classes will be impacted, including PPIs, 
statins, anti-histamines, anti-depressants, ACE inhibitors 
and prostatic hypertrophy treatments. Price cuts will 
reach up to 15%. 
dec-06 -1 
Osteoporosis France 
The first three-month pack available on the French 
market will be the osteoporosis drug Actonel 
(risedronate) starting in mid-August 2005. 
july-05 0 
Osteoporosis Germany 
The Baden-Wurttemberg regional association of local 
health insurance funds and the manufacturer MSD Sharp 
& Dohme have signed a discount deal covering three 
patented products. The osteoporosis drug Fosavance 
(alendronate and colecalciferol) is one of these products 
that will have price reductions. 
may-08 -1 
Osteoporosis Germany 
The private insurer Barmenia  and the manufacturer 
Daiichi Sankyo have signed a discount deal covering two 
patented products. The osteoporosis drug Evista 
(raloxifene) is one of these products that will have price 
reductions. 
juyl-08 -1 
Osteoporosis France 
Three-month packs of medicines introduced to treat four 
chronic conditions. On average 13% cheaper than 
monthly packs. 
febr-10 -1 
Calcium Channel 
Blockers 
Germany 
16 regional associations of AOKs have signed a 
comprehensive discount agreement on selected drugs - 
including ACE inhibitors, statins, calcium antagonists and 
proton pump inhibitors - with 11 generic manufacturers 
febr-07 -1 
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Calcium Channel 
Blockers 
Germany 
The SK has set 13 new reference price groups. ACE 
inhibitor and calcium channel blocker combinations fall 
under level 3 (drugs with therapeutically comparable 
effects). These will take effect Jan 1, 2008. 
sept-07 0 
ACE Inhibitors France 
Ex-factory prices of 38 3-month drug packs will be cut by 
around 5%. Many of which are antihypertensives and 
ACE inhibitors. 
febr-09 -1 
ACE Inhibitors Germany 
16 regional associations of AOKs have signed a 
comprehensive discount agreement on selected drugs - 
including ACE inhibitors, statins, calcium antagonists and 
proton pump inhibitors - with 11 generic manufacturers 
febr-07 -1 
ACE Inhibitors Germany 
The SK has set 13 new reference price groups. ACE 
inhibitor and calcium channel blocker combinations fall 
under level 3 (drugs with therapeutically comparable 
effects). These will take effect Jan 1, 2008. 
jan-08 0 
ACE Inhibitors France 
Price cuts for patented medicines in therapeutic classes 
where a generic exists were published on Nov 29, 2006. 
In total 12 active ingredients corresponding to six 
therapeutic classes will be impacted, including PPIs, 
statins, anti-histamines, anti-depressants, ACE inhibitors 
and prostatic hypertrophy treatments. Price cuts will 
reach up to 15%. 
dec-06 -1 
Beta Blockers Germany 
Barmer health insurance fund and Merck Pharma have 
signed a new discount agreement. Merck will grant price 
discounts for its beta blockers: Concor, Concor COR and 
Concor plus. 
dec-05 -1 
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APPENDIX B:  ECONOMETRIC FINDINGS BASED ON ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS 
Table B1: Regressions with Laspeyres Chained Indices 
Therapeutic Class Level of Aggregation, Country*Class Fixed Effects 
OLS (1) (2)  
VARIABLES 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑘𝑛𝑡  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑘𝑛𝑡   
    
Time trend (monthly) -0.000119** -0.000115**  
 (5.06e-05) (5.09e-05)  
sh_expired -0.0205**   
 (0.00832)   
sh_expired_pharma  -0.0236**  
  (0.00976)  
sh_expired_physic  -0.0175**  
  (0.00740)  
Regulatory Changes    
ac_price_impact 0.000908 0.00123  
 (0.00135) (0.00141)  
ac_price_impact_tcl 0.00106 0.000377  
 (0.00153) (0.00194)  
Constant 0.00514 0.00534  
 (0.00491) (0.00480)  
Observations 7,095 7,095  
R-squared 0.013 0.014  
Country-Class FE Yes Yes  
    
    
Standard errors clustered by country-class 
  
Page 57 
 
 
Table B2: Regressions with Paasche Chained Indices 
Therapeutic Class Level of Aggregation, Country*Class Fixed Effects 
OLS (1) (2)  
VARIABLES 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑘𝑛𝑡  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑘𝑛𝑡   
    
Time trend (monthly) -0.00102*** -0.00100***  
 (0.000279) (0.000279)  
sh_expired -0.0312   
 (0.0307)   
sh_expired_pharma  -0.0424  
  (0.0341)  
sh_expired_physic  -0.0201  
  (0.0318)  
Regulatory Changes    
ac_price_impact -0.0163** -0.0151*  
 (0.00762) (0.00769)  
ac_price_impact_tcl 0.00632 0.00383  
 (0.00427) (0.00452)  
Constant 0.0370*** 0.0377***  
 (0.0139) (0.0139)  
Observations 7,095 7,095  
R-squared 0.028 0.029  
Country-Class FE Yes Yes  
    
    
Standard errors clustered by country-class 
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Table B3: Regressions with Laspeyres (fixed US January 2004 = 1.00 basis) Indices 
Therapeutic Class Level of Aggregation, Country*Class Fixed Effects 
OLS (1) (2)  
VARIABLES 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑘𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑘𝑛𝑡  
    
Time trend (monthly) -0.00896*** -0.00883***  
 (0.00122) (0.00119)  
sh_expired -1.126***   
 (0.210)   
sh_expired_pharma  -1.243***  
  (0.253)  
sh_expired_physic  -1.009***  
  (0.173)  
Regulatory Changes    
ac_price_impact -0.0201 -0.00782  
 (0.0230) (0.0201)  
ac_price_impact_tcl 0.0140 -0.0121  
 (0.0192) (0.0265)  
Constant 0.0634 0.0713  
 (0.130) (0.131)  
Observations 7,183 7,183  
R-squared 0.621 0.626  
Country-Class FE Yes Yes  
Standard errors clustered by country-class 
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Table B4: Regressions with Paasche (fixed US January 2004 = 1.000 basis) Indices 
Therapeutic Class Level of Aggregation, Country*Class Fixed Effects 
OLS (1) (2)  
VARIABLES 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑘𝑛𝑡  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑘𝑛𝑡   
    
Time trend (monthly) -0.00978*** -0.00967***  
 (0.00138) (0.00135)  
sh_expired -1.238***   
 (0.259)   
sh_expired_pharma  -1.337***  
  (0.315)  
sh_expired_physic  -1.139***  
  (0.214)  
Regulatory Changes    
ac_price_impact -0.0869*** -0.0764***  
 (0.0295) (0.0256)  
ac_price_impact_tcl 0.0248 0.00265  
 (0.0241) (0.0321)  
Constant 0.145 0.152  
 (0.162) (0.164)  
Observations 7,183 7,183  
R-squared 0.593 0.596  
Country-Class FE Yes Yes  
Standard errors clustered by country-class 
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Table B5: Regressions with Fisher (fixed US January 2004 = 1.000 basis) Indices 
Therapeutic Class Level of Aggregation, Country*Class Fixed Effects 
OLS (1) (2)  
VARIABLES 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑘𝑛𝑡  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑘𝑛𝑡   
    
Time trend (monthly) -0.00937*** -0.00925***  
 (0.00124) (0.00121)  
Sh_expired -1.182***   
 (0.232)   
sh_expired_pharma  -1.290***  
  (0.282)  
sh_expired_physic  -1.074***  
  (0.191)  
Regulatory Changes    
ac_price_impact -0.0535** -0.0421*  
 (0.0252) (0.0217)  
ac_price_impact_tcl 0.0194 -0.00473  
 (0.0202) (0.0282)  
Constant 0.104 0.112  
 (0.144) (0.146)  
Observations 7,183 7,183  
R-squared 0.628 0.632  
Country-Class FE Yes Yes  
Standard errors clustered by country-class 
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Table B6: Regressions with Laspeyres (fixed US January 2004 = 1.000 basis) Indices 
Country and Class Fixed Effects, not Country*Class 
Therapeutic Class Level of Aggregation 
 
OLS (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑘𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑘𝑛𝑡 
Time trend (monthly) -0.00950*** -0.00946*** 
 (0.00168) (0.00167) 
sh_expired -0.915***  
 (0.155)  
sh_expired_pharma  -0.981*** 
  (0.210) 
sh_expired_physic  -0.806*** 
  (0.114) 
Regulatory Changes   
ac_price_impact -0.0140 -0.00412 
 (0.0202) (0.0219) 
ac_price_impact_tcl 0.0142 -0.00534 
 (0.0153) (0.0270) 
Country Dummies (reference is US)   
CANADA -0.0585 -0.0607 
 (0.171) (0.169) 
FRANCE -0.397** -0.457** 
 (0.149) (0.160) 
GERMANY -0.603*** -0.714** 
 (0.163) (0.230) 
ITALY -0.591** -0.698** 
 (0.211) (0.230) 
NETHERLANDS -0.704*** -0.701*** 
 (0.204) (0.206) 
SPAIN -0.745*** -0.842*** 
 (0.165) (0.175) 
UK -0.762*** -0.758*** 
 (0.182) (0.184) 
Constant 0.431** 0.473** 
 (0.178) (0.191) 
Observations 7,183 7,183 
R-squared 0.516 0.518 
Class FE Yes Yes 
Standard errors clustered by country-class 
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Table B7: Regressions with Paasche (fixed US January 2004 = 1.000 basis) Indices 
Fixed Effects by Country and Class, not Country*Class 
Therapeutic Class Level of Aggregation 
OLS (1) (2)  
VARIABLES 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑘𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑘𝑛𝑡  
    
Time trend (monthly) -0.0105*** -0.0105***  
 (0.00198) (0.00199)  
sh_expired -0.959***   
 (0.131)   
sh_expired_pharma  -0.980***  
  (0.216)  
sh_expired_physic  -0.924***  
  (0.105)  
Regulatory Changes    
ac_price_impact -0.0788*** -0.0756**  
 (0.0234) (0.0277)  
ac_price_impact_tcl 0.0251 0.0188  
 (0.0141) (0.0303)  
Country Dummies (reference is US)    
CANADA 0.0827 0.0820  
 (0.162) (0.162)  
FRANCE -0.176 -0.195  
 (0.198) (0.199)  
GERMANY -0.495* -0.531  
 (0.266) (0.345)  
ITALY -0.398 -0.433  
 (0.242) (0.288)  
NETHERLANDS -0.580** -0.579**  
 (0.213) (0.214)  
SPAIN -0.708** -0.739**  
 (0.237) (0.236)  
UK -0.777*** -0.776***  
 (0.242) (0.242)  
Constant 0.377* 0.390  
 (0.197) (0.216)  
Observations 7,183 7,183  
R-squared 0.444 0.444  
Class FE Yes Yes  
Standard errors clustered by country-class 
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